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THE END OF PRECLEARANCE AS WE KNEW IT:
HOW THE SUPREME COURT TRANSFORMED
SECTION 5 OF THEVOTING RIGHTS ACTt
Peyton McCrary*
ChristopherSeaman**

Richard Valelly***
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 requires certain jurisdictions with a
history of racial discrimination to obtain "preclearance" of proposed electoral changes
from the United States Department ofJustice or a three-judgepanel in the United
States District Courtfor the District of Columbia. This provision, which is set to
expire in August 2007, has successfully reduced racial and ethnic discriminationin
voting.
The United States Supreme Court determined in a 5-4 decision, Reno v. Bossier
Parish School Board, 528 U.S. 230 (2000), that Section 5's prohibition on the
enforcement of electoral changes which have a discriminatory purpose does not apply
to electoral changes that were not intended to "retrogress," or make worse, the
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position of minority voters. This interpretation upset a long-standing consensus
among executive, legislative, and judicial actors that Section 5 prohibited all changes
enacted with an unconstitutional discriminatory purpose, not just those which made
minority voters worse off. This Article explains how the Bossier majority
dramatically transformed Section 5 and demonstrates, through an empirical analysis
of theJustice Department's Section 5 objection letters, how it significantly weakened
the statute's ability to protect minority voting rights. It concludes by arguing that
Congress should amend Section 5 in 2007 to supercede the Bossier decision.
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INTRODUCTION
In August 2007, several special provisions of the Voting Rights Act of
1965'-the "preclearance" requirement in Section 5 of the Act, the authority of the Department ofJustice to use federal examiners and observers,
1.
Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. % 1971,
1973 to 1973bb-1 (2000)). The Voting Rights Act is often regarded as the most successful
civil rights act in our history. See, e.g., Extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearing
Before the Senate Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on theJudiciary,94th Cong.
121 (1975)(statement of Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, former Attorney General, United
States) ("The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is the most successful piece of civil rights legislation ever enacted.").
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and protections for the voting rights of language minorities-will expire,
unless extended by congressional action. Of the provisions due to expire
in 2007, the most important for the protection of minority voting rights
is the preclearance requirement set forth in Section 5.2 Jurisdictions covered by the preclearance process, mostly in states of the former
Confederacy, must obtain federal approval of voting changes, either
through a declaratory judgement action before a three-judge panel in the
District of Columbia or from the Department of Justice, before these
changes become legally enforceable.3 In order to secure preclearance of
desired changes, covered jurisdictions have over the years agreed to remove barriers to registration and voting, as well as to eliminate election
structures that dilute minority voting strength.4 Approval requires proof by
the jurisdiction that the change, in the language of the statute, "does not
have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race or color."'
Prior to January 2000, the definition of discriminatory "purpose"
under Section 5 had been understood as synonymous with the term's
meaning in constitutional cases: a practice designed by a covered jurisdiction to restrict access to registration or voting, or to dilute minority
voting strength, in violation of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments
was thought to be prohibited by the purpose requirement of Section 5.
For a decade federal courts had treated the assessment of discriminatory
effect under Section 5 as equivalent to the measurement of discriminatory
effect in a constitutional challenge However, in a key 1976 decision,
Beer v. United States,8 the Supreme Court bifurcated the statutory and
2.
42 U.S.C. 5 1973c (2000).
3.
Id. 5§ 1973b-c; see also 28 C.ER. pt. 51 app. (2003) (listing jurisdictions covered
under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act).
4.
Drew S. Days III, Section 5 and the Role of the Justice Department, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINOITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 52, 52-53 (Bernard
Grofinan & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992).The implementation and impact of Section 5
is assessed by the case studies in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994).
5.
42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
6.
City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 378 (1975) ("An official action ...taken for the purpose of discriminating against Negroes on account of their race
has no legitimacy at all under our Constitution or under the statute."); see also Mark A.
Posner, Post-1990 Redistrictings and the Preclearance Requirement of Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act," in RACE AND REDISTRICTING IN THE 1990s, at 80, 100 (Bernard Grofman ed.,
1998) ("Both the Attorney General and the federal courts consistently have construed the
Section 5 purpose test as being co-extensive with the constitutional prohibition on enacting redistricting plans (or other voting practices or procedures) that minimize minority
electoral opportunity for a discriminatory reason....").
7.
See, e.g., Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 390 (1971) ("Congress intended to
adopt the concept of voting articulated in Reynolds v. Sims ...[to] protect Negroes against
a dilution of their voting power.").
8.
425 U.S. 130 (1976).
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constitutional effect standards by announcing that in the Section 5 context, a voting change likely to produce a racially discriminatory effect
prohibited by either the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments was entitled to preclearance unless it would make matters worse for minority voters
than the existing plan, an effect the Court referred to as "retrogression."
On January 24, 2000, the United States Supreme Court, by a narrow
5-4 majority, fundamentally redefined-and weakened-the concept of
discriminatory intent under Section 5 in Reno v.Bossier Parish School Board
(Bossier I1). '0 Under the new standard, a voting change with an unconstitutional racial purpose, no matter how strong the evidence of
discriminatory intent, would have to be precleared unless the evidence
also showed that the change was intended to make matters worse for minority voters than under the status quo-which the Court termed
"retrogressive intent."" In the guise of making the definition of purpose
under Section 5 congruent with the definition of "retrogressive effect,"
the decision effectively minimized use of Section 5 as a weapon for protecting minority voters from discrimination. 2
Determining the impact of this doctrinal change on Section 5 enforcement by the Department of Justice is the central thrust of this
Article. The key evidence on which we rely is found in the 996 letters
from 1968 through 1999-and the 41 letters after the Bossier II decision-in which the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights explained
the basis for objecting to voting changes. These objection letters, unlike
court opinions regarding preclearance, do not set forth the full body of
evidence on which the Department relies in making each decision, and
9.
Id. at 141. Even so, the Court in Beer recognized that the concept of purpose
was to be defined the same way under both Section 5 of the Act and the Constitution. Id.
("[A]n ameliorative new legislative apportionment cannot violate § 5 unless the new apportionment itself so discriminates on the basis of race or color as to violate the
Constitution." (emphasis added)).
10.
528 U.S. 320 (2000) [hereinafter Bossier II]. The Court's initial opinion, Reno v.
Bossier Parish School Board, 520 U.S. 471 (1997) [hereinafter Bossier ], decided a related
issue, discussed below, but remanded to the lower court certain questions regarding the
purpose prong of Section 5, which were ultimately resolved in Bossier I.
11.
Bossier II, 528 U.S. at 326; see also id. at 341 ("In light of the language of Sec. 5
and our prior holding in Beer, we hold that Sec. 5 does not prohibit preclearance of a redistricting plan enacted with a discriminatory but nonretrogressive purpose.").
12.
Ellen D. Katz, Federalism, Preclearance, and the Rehnquist Court, 46 VILL. L. REV.
1179 (2001) (providing a brief but careful analysis of the Court's Bossier II decision); see
also Alaina C. Beverly, Case Note, Lowering the Preclearance Hurdle: Reno v. Bossier Parish
School Board, 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. 695 (2000). There are other articles that are less illuminating. See Charlotte Marx Harper, A Promise for Litigation: Reno v. Bossier Parish
School Board, 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 647 (2000); Lindsay Ryan Erickson, Note, Threading the
Needle: Resolving the Impasse Between Equal Protection and Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 54
VAND. L. REV. 2057 (2001); David Harvey, Note, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act Does Not
Bar Preclearance of a Redistricting Plan Enacted With a Discriminatory But Nonretrogressive Purpose: Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 39 DuQ. L. REv. 477 (2001).
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thus do not provide a basis for evaluating the accuracy of the Department's fact-finding.1 3 The letters are, however, the official record of the
legal bases asserted for each objection and thus constitute the essential
4
starting point for an analysis of the Department's preclearance policy.'
Our analysis reveals that by the 1990s the intent, or purpose, prong
of Section 5 had become the dominant basis for objections to discriminatory voting changes. During that decade an astonishing 43 percent of all
objections were, according to our assessment, based on discriminatory
purpose alone (see infra Table 2)." s Thus, a key issue for Congress in determining how to deal with the preclearance requirement of the Act due
to expire in 2007-assuming it seeks to restore the protection of minority
voting rights that existed before January 2 000-is whether to revise the
language of Section 5 so as to restore the long-accepted definition of
purpose thrown out by Bossier II. We believe that the analysis in the following pages provides critical evidence for 16the debate over
reauthorization and revision of the Voting Rights Act.
We begin in Part I with an overview of Section 5 case law before
Bossier II, focusing on the ways in which the purpose and effect standards
were interpreted by the federal courts. In Part II, we present our analysis
of the implementation of Section 5 by the Department ofJustice prior to
Bossier II, relying on evidence found in objection letters. In Part 11, we
probe the Bossier Parish litigation in an effort to explain the ways in
which the majority opinion in Bossier II recasts the holding of past Court
decisions regarding preclearance. We also examine the critique of the majority's view propounded by dissenting justices, which largely accords
with our own assessment. Part IV looks at the impact of Bossier II on the
Department's subsequent objection decisions and sums up our analysis.

13.
Our analysis was concluded in June 2004; only one objection has been interposed since then. Memoranda which present the factual evidence and legal basis
underlying each objection, the more appropriate analogue to formal court opinions, are
restricted internal documents. In the course of his official responsibilities, the senior author
has examined many memoranda recommending objections. Because these documents are
unavailable to researchers, and because it is important for any social science analysis to be
replicable, we have not relied on these documents in our analysis.
14.
Two resourceful studies of Section 5 objection policy have previously utilized
these letters as a major resource. Neither, however, has undertaken a comprehensive quantitative analysis of the legal basis asserted by the Department for its decisions. See Hiroshi
Motomura, Preclearance Under Section Five of the Voting Rights Act, 61 N.C. L. REv. 189
(1983); Posner, supra note 6.
15.
Another 19 percent of the Department's objections were based on a combination of discriminatory purpose and retrogressive effect. Arguably this 19 percent would
have been interposed even under the new definition of intent imposed by the Supreme
Court in Bossier II.
16.
The Department of Justice has at the time of this writing taken no position
regarding revision of the Act.
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I. EVOLVING DEFINITIONS OF PURPOSE AND EFFECT

A. Administrative Review Under Section 5
During the first three years after adoption of the Act in 1965, the
preclearance requirement set forth in Section 5 was rarely invoked.17 During that time, however, Southern legislatures, faced with the prospect that
Black voters might cast a majority of the ballots in some single-member
districts, often shifted to at-large election systems, numbered place or
runoff requirements, or gerrymandered district lines to minimize the
number of Black-majority districts.' Active enforcement of Section 5 to
deal with such changes awaited the 1969 ruling in Allen v. State Board of
Elections.'9 In that decision, the Supreme Court determined that all
changes affecting voting, including measures with the potential to dilute
minority voting strength as well as procedures for registering or casting
votes, required preclearance by three-judge trial courts in the District of
Columbia or through administrative review by the Department of Justice. When the changes at issue were submitted for preclearance, the
Department2 objected to those that appeared likely to have a discrimina1
tory effect.

17.
Armand Derfner, Racial Discriminationand the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 523,
578 n.244 (1973).
18.
See, e.g., id. at 553-55, 572-74; DAVID J. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 203-06, 310-13 (1978); FRANK
R. PARKER, BLACK VOTES COUNT: POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT IN Mississippi AFTER 1965 3477 (1990); Peyton McCrary, et al., Alabama, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE
IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofinan
eds., 1994); LAUGHLIN McDONALD, A VOTING RIGHTS ODYSSEY: BLACK ENFRANCHISEMENT
IN GEORGIA 131-36 (2003).
19.

393 U.S. 544 (1969).

20.
Id. at 569. The Court based its decision in Allen on its reasoning in the Alabama
reapportionment case Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964): "[Tjhe right to vote can
be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a
ballot." Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 566 (1969). Abigail Thernstrom has observed that the Mississippi laws at issue in Allen were racially discriminatory in both intent
and effect. ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS (1987). "Clearly the Court could not stand by while southern whites
in covered states--states with dirty hands on questions of race-altered electoral rules to
buttress white hegemony." Id. at 4.
21.
U.S. Dept't of Justice, Objection Letter to State of Mississippi, (May 21, 1969),
disallowing laws requiring appointment of county superintendents of education, new
qualification requirements for independent candidates, and optional use of at-large elections for county boards of supervisors. Subsequendy the state adopted a revised version of
the at-large provision for county boards: Miss. Code Ann. § 37-5-15 (1972). When the
Department discovered this change five years later, it objected once again. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Objection Letter to State of Mississippi (July 18, 1977).
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Preclearance review by the Department provides a quicker and less
expensive alternative to litigation and the Department seeks to function as
a "surrogate" for the District of Columbia trial courts.22 The Attorney
General has always delegated responsibility for preclearance decisions to
the Assistant Attorney General ("AAG") who heads the Civil Rights Division. Administrative reorganization in 1969 produced a separate section
within the Civil Rights Division specializing in voting rights. The new
Voting Section provided the factual investigation for preclearance reviews
and made detailed recommendations to the AAG for Civil Rights. Prodded by liberal critics in Congress, the Department developed detailed
guidelines for enforcing Section 5 that were, in turn, endorsed by the Supreme Court.23 Other Supreme Court decisions over the next decade
expanded the scope of Section 5 and strengthened the Department's en24
forcement powers.
The Supreme Court, however, agreed to hear arguments and issue
opinions in only a few cases. As a result, the District of Columbia trial
courts who hear preclearance lawsuits by the jurisdictions played a major
role in shaping Section 5 case law. Often, the Supreme Court declined to
hear oral argument and summarily affirmed the trial court's decision. Although summary affirmances simply endorse the lower court's decision
and not necessarily its reasoning, they are binding precedents for the
lower courts and the Department
ofJustice until contradicted by a future
• • 25
Supreme Court decision.
22.
The responsibility to act as a surrogate for the D.C. court, 28 C.ER. § 51.52(a)
(2004), was set forth in the Department's original Section 5 guidelines. 28 C.ER. § 51.19
(1971).
23.
Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
28 Fed. Reg. 18,186 (Sept. 10, 1971). The guidelines, which have been revised several
times over the years, are found at 28 C.ER. pt. 51 (2004).The Supreme Court found the
regulations "wholly reasonable and consistent with the Act." Georgia v. United States, 411
U.S. 526, 541 (1973); see HOwARD BALL ET AL., COMPROMISED COMPLIANCE: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1965VOTING RIGHTS ACT 66-73, 91-93 (1982) (discussing the development
of the procedures for enforcing Section 5); STEVEN F. LAWSON, IN PURSUIT OF POWER:

1965-1982,at 162-178 (1985).
24.
See Drew S.Days III & Lani Guinier, Enforcement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act, in MINORITY VoTE DILUTION 164, 167-80 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984); John P.
MacCoon, The Enforcement of the PreclearanceRequirement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965,29 CATH.U.L. REv. 107 (1979).
25.
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975) ("[L]ower courts are bound by
summary decisions by this Court 'until such time as the Court informs (them) that (they)
are not.'"); see also Picou v. Gillum, 813 E2d 1121 (11th Cir. 1987) ("A summary affirmance by the Supreme Court has binding precedential effect."). On the other hand, the
precedential value of a summary affirmance has distinct limits. See Anderson v. Celebrezze,
460 U.S. 780, 786 n.5 (1983) ("We have often recognized that the precedential value of a
summary affirmance extends no further than 'the precise issues presented and necessarily
decided by those actions."); Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977) ("Because a
summary affirmance is an affirmance of the judgment only, the rationale of the affirmance
may not be gleaned solely from the opinion below [but does] prevent lower courts from
SoUTHERN BLACKS AND ELECTORAL POLITICS,
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Section 5, like the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, has both
a purpose and an effect prong. 26 The Supreme Court first addressed the
legal standard to be applied in assessing the purpose requirement in the27
context of a municipal annexation case, City of Richmond v. United States.
The Court emphasized that preclearance should be denied if a voting
change were racially motivated so as to violate the Constitution: "An official action, whether an annexation or otherwise, taken for the purpose of
discriminating against Negroes on account of their race has no legitimacy
at all under our Constitution or under the statute."2 For this reason, the
29
Court remanded the case for an analysis of the purpose issue.
In the City of Richmond case, however, the Court gave an unusual
twist to the effect standard where dilutive annexations were concerned.
Municipalities facing potential objections to such annexations could obtain preclearance by adopting an election plan that fairly reflected
coming to conclusions on the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those
actions."); see also ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 277, 279-85, 333-35
(8th ed. 1993); 16B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

4003 (2d ed. 1996).
26.
42 U.S.C. 5 1973c (2000). We use the terms "purpose" and "intent"-and the
terms "result" and "effect"-interchangeably here.

27.

City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 378 (1975). Justice Lewis E

Powell, Jr., who subsequently originated the "retrogressive intent" theory in City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462 (1987), abstained from the decision in City of

Richmond, no doubt because he had, before joining the Court, sought to persuade the
Attorney General to preclear the annexation. Letter from Lewis E Powell.Jr., Esq., to John
N. Mitchell, Attorney General, United States (Aug. 9, 1971) (public document, Voting
Section, Civil Rights Division, Department ofJustice).
28.
City of Richmond, 422 U.S. at 378.The Court had previously held that municipal
annexations that significantly decrease the percentage of a city's residents who belong to a
racial minority group can dilute minority voting strength and are thus covered by Section
5. Perkins, 400 U.S. at 382-83 (1971) (reversing the decision of a three-judge court in
Mississippi that ignored Allen v. State Board of Elections, to hold that annexations were beyond the scope of Section 5).
29.
City of Richmond, 422 U.S. at 378.The change at issue in the purpose analysis on
remand was a settlement plan to which the city and the Justice Department had recently
agreed. Dissenting Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Douglas would have denied preclearance of the annexation based on the evidence of discriminatory intent as to the original
annexation decision, in which the city retained at-large elections.
[T]he record is replete with statements by Richmond officials that prove beyond question that the predominant (if not the sole) motive and desire of the
negotiators of the 1969 settlement was to acquire 44,000 additional white
citizens for Richmond, in order to avert a transfer of political control to
what was fast becoming a Black population majority.
422 U.S. at 382 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see JOHN V. MOESER & RUTLEDGE M. DENNIS, THE
POLITICS OF ANNEXATION: OLIGARCHIC POWER IN A SOUTHERN CITY 88-93, 98-102, 10709 (1982) (additional evidence of racial purpose); see also THERNSTROM, supra note 20, at
146 (agreeing that "in Richmond fear of Black political control had been the motivating
force" behind the annexation).
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minority voting strength for the enlarged city, normally a single member
district system, by its decision." Otherwise, such cities would likely be
condemned to declining tax revenues, as well-off-Whites moved to nearby
suburbs to escape racial integration.3 1 As a result of this decision, departmental objections to annexations often persuaded Southern municipalities
to give up at-large elections and switch to single-member district plans.32
B. Purpose and Effect in Beer v. United States
The Court's first major restriction on the scope of the Act was announced in its 1976 decision Beer v. United States.33 The city of New
Orleans sought a declaratory judgement preclearing its redistricting plan
following the 1970 census. The trial court refused to preclear the plan, on
the grounds that it had the effect of diluting minority voting strength as
defined by the Supreme Court in the landmark Fourteenth Amendment
case White v. Regester.3 4 The Supreme Court reversed the lower court,
however, ruling that the term "effect" has a different meaning under Section 5 than under the Constitution. It determined that, in the
preclearance context, discriminatory "effect" was to be defined as "retrogression," a newly-minted term that described changes which place
minority voters in a worse position than under the status quo. 35 As a result
of Beer, changes that do not make matters worse for minority voters are
entitled to preclearance under the effect prong of Section 5, even where
the new method of election appears likely to dilute minority voting

30.
City of Richmond, 422 U.S. at 370-71.
31.
Id. at 371.
32.
During the years 1975-1980, for example, annexations accounted for the largest
single type of voting change to which the Department ofJustice objected, and most were
withdrawn only when the municipality switched from at-large to single-member district
elections. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: UNFULFILLED GOALS
65, 69 tbl. 6.4 (1981).
33.
425 U.S. 130 (1976).
34.
412 U.S. 755 (1973); see Beer v. United States, 374 E Supp. 363, 384, 387-90,
393-99, 401-02 (D.D.C. 1974). At that time the constitutional standard was not understood as requiring proof of discriminatory intent. See James U. Blacksher & Larry T.
Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v. Bolden: Have the White Suburbs
Commandeered the Fifteenth Amendment?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 22-26 (1982); Katherine Inglis
Butler, Constitutional and Statutory Challenges to Election Structures: Dilution and the Value of
the Right to Vote, 42 LA. L. REv. 851, 883-88 (1982);Timothy G. O'Rourke, Constitutional
and Statutory Challenges to Local At-Large Elections, 17 U. RICH. L. REV. 39, 51-55 (1982);
Frank R. Parker, The "Results" Test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act:Abandoning the Intent
Standard,69 VA. L. REV. 715,722-26 (1983).
35.
Beer, 425 U.S. at 141.
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strength or otherwise discriminate,
as in voting changes affecting registra36
tion or casting a ballot.
Whether or not the purpose of the change was racially discriminatory was not before the Court in Beer,37 but it referred to the purpose
prong of Section 5 in terms similar to City of Richmond: "We conclude,
therefore, that such an ameliorative new legislative apportionment cannot
violate § 5 unless the new apportionment itself so discriminates on the
basis of race or color as to violate the Constitution.' 8 The Court's reference
to a constitutional violation appears understandable only as a reference to
the purpose test in Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment cases, 39 and that
is the interpretation placed upon this wording by the Supreme Court itself in subsequent preclearance cases.4a
C. The Purpose StandardAfter Beer
The Supreme Court summarily affirmed Wilkes County v. United
States, a Georgia case, which exemplifies the purpose standard after Beer.4"
The case involved a change from single member districts to at-large elections in the early 1970s for both county commission and school board.
Voting patterns were racially polarized and no Black candidates had been
elected to either governing body countywide, despite
the fact that African
• 42
Americans made up 43 percent of the population. In Wilkes County, the

36.
See, e.g., Motomura, supra note 14, at 204 (regarding the application of the retrogression test to individual ballot access).
37.
Because the trial court decided the case on the grounds that the redistricting
plan had a dilutive effect, it did not reach the issue of whether the change had a discriminatory purpose and thus the intent of the plan was not among the questions presented on
appeal. Beer, 374 F. Supp. at 387.
38.
Beer, 425 U.S. at 141 (emphasis added).
39.
Steve Bickerstaff, Reapportionment by State Legislatures:A Guide for the 1980's, 34
Sw. L.J. 607, 669 (1980) ("The Beer Court dealt only with whether the reapportionment
plan in question has the effect of denying the right to vote on account of race. A state
carries the additional burden of showing that the plan does not have such a purpose.");
James E Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race Discrimination:Perspectives on the Purpose vs.
Results Approach from the Voting Rights Act, 69 VA. L.Rav. 633, 661-63 (1983) ("[Elven
without retrogression, a covered jurisdiction will violate Section 5 if an impermissible
racial purpose is behind an electoral change."). See infra, Part III (B)(2).
40.
City of Port Arthur v. United States, 459 U.S. 159, 168 (1982) (holding that
even a non-retrogressive plan "would nevertheless be invalid if adopted for racially discriminatory purposes"); see also City of Pleasant Grove, 479 U.S. at 469, 471 n.11, 472
(1987). Even justices who opposed a strong Voting Rights Act seemed to agree. See, for
example, the observation that "it is clear that if the proposed changes would violate the
Constitution, Congress could certainly prohibit their implementation." City of Rome v.
United States, 446 U.S. 156,210 (1980)(Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
41.
450 E Supp. 1171 (D.D.C.), aff'd mem., 439 U.S. 999 (1978).
42.
Wilkes County, 450 F Supp. at 1175-77.
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trial court applied the constitutional purpose standard as set forth by the
Supreme Court in its recent Arlington Heights decision. 43
The starting point for the trial court was the fact that the change to
at-large elections followed a substantial increase in minority voter registration after the Voting Rights Act, thus putting continued White control
at risk under the single-member district plan. 4 No African Americans had
been elected to office, served as Democratic party officials in the oneparty county, or been appointed to fill vacancies for elected offices.4 ' Nor
had any Black citizens been consulted about the decision to adopt an atlarge plan. The county claimed that the purpose of the change was solely
to satisfy the one person, one vote requirement, but the court found that
argument a mere pretext; districts could simply have been equalized in
population after the 1970 census instead of shifting to countywide elections. 46 The county failed the Arlington Heights purpose test and Beer's
retrogression test; thus, its at-large plan was not entitled to preclearance.
How the purpose standard should be applied where the election
plan is not retrogressive was exemplified by another influential trial court
decision summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court, the Georgia congressional redistricting case Busbee v. Smith. 48 The case turned on the facts
surrounding the fifth congressional district, centered in the capital city of
Atlanta. Black civil rights leader Andrew Young had represented the district during the mid-1970s, when Whites were a majority of its votingage population, but when Young left to head the United Nations delegation in 1977 the district elected a moderate White Democrat, Wyche
Fowler. After the 1980 census the legislature increased the Black population percentage in the fifth district to 57 percent, but Whites were still 54

43.
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66
(1977).
44.
450 F Supp. at 1176.
45.
Id. at 1174-75.
46.
Id. at 1175, 1177-78.
47.
Id. at 1174-76. In a similar case, the State of Mississippi sought preclearance for
its state legislature's redistricting plan. Mississippi v. United States, 490 E Supp. 569, 582-83
(D.D.C. 1979), aff'd mem., 444 U.S. 1050 (1980). As the trial court saw it, the state's redistricting plan "constitute[d] a clear enhancement of the position of racial minorities with
respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise." Id. at 582 n.6. This finding,
however, did not end the court's inquiry into whether the plan violated Section 5:
"[l]egislative reapportionment plans must be scrutinized to determine if they were enacted
with the prohibited 'purpose' of denying or abridging Black voting strength." Id. at 583.
Section 5's purpose prong was equivalent, in the court's view, to the constitutional standard
for discriminatory purpose: "The prohibited 'purpose' of section 5 may be described as the
sort of invidious discriminatory purpose that would support a challenge to official action
as an unconstitutional denial of equal protection." Id. The trial court found that the state
met this standard and precleared the redistricting plan at issue. Id.
48.
549 E Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd mem., 459 U.S. 1166 (1983).
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percent of the registered voters. 49 Because voting patterns had become
more racially polarized in recent years, most observers believed that the
Black concentration in the newly configured district was not great
enough to provide African American voters an equal opportunity to elect
a candidate of their choice. 50
Applying Arlington Heights, the trial court found abundant evidence,
both direct and circumstantial, that "[t]he Fifth District was drawn to suppress Black voting strength."'" For example, a key player in the legislative
decision-making process, Joe Mack Wilson, House Reapportionment
Committee Chair, complained to fellow legislators that "the Justice Department is trying to make us draw nigger districts and I don't want to
draw nigger districts."5'2 The trial court also found that Speaker Tom Murphy "purposefully discriminated on the basis of race in selecting the
House members of the conference committee where the final redistricting plan was determined," in that he selected White legislators "he knew
would adamantly oppose the creation of a congressional district in which
Black voters would be able to elect a candidate of their choice," 53
and refused to appoint any Black members to the conference committee.
Because the redistricting plan had a racially discriminatory purpose,
it was not entitled to preclearance, even though it was ameliorative rather
than retrogressive in effect. As the three-judge court stated, "[s]imply
demonstrating that a plan increases Black voting strength does not entitle
the State to the declaratory relief it seeks; the State must also demonstrate
the absence of discriminatory purpose."5 The court found the plan objectionable "because State officials successfully implemented a scheme
designed to minimize Black voting strength," and as a result the plan was
"not free of racially discriminatory purpose.,"55

49.
Busbee, 549 E Supp. at 498. The district to which Young was elected in 1972,
thanks in part to an unusual 25 percent White crossover vote, was adopted following a
Department ofJustice objection to an earlier plan, drawn in 1971 with the goal of preventing the election of an African American to Congress. McDonald, supra note 18, at
149-50.
50.
Busbee, 549 E Supp. at 499.
51.
Id. at 515; see also McDONALD, supra note 18, at 168-72 (providing additional
evidence of racial purpose).
52.
Busbee, 549 E Supp. at 501.Wilson was also quoted as saying "I'm not for drawing a nigger district and I'm not for drawing a Republican district." Id. at 512. According
to the trial court, "Wilson uses the term 'nigger' [routinely] to refer to Black persons." Id.
at 500.
53.
Id. at 510. Murphy explained at trial that "I was concerned that ...we were
gerrymandering a district to create a Black district where a Black would certainly be
elected." Id. at 509-10.
54.
Id. at 516.
55.
Id. at 518.
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D. The Issue of Retrogressive Intent

Among the questions presented on appeal by the state in Busbee was
the very question sabsequently at issue in Bossier II:
Whether a Congressional reapportionment plan that does not
have the purpose of diminishing the existing level of Black
voting strength [that is, an intent to retrogress] can be deemed to
have the purpose of denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race within the meaning of Section 5 of the Voting
56
Rights Act.
By refusing to hear oral argument in Busbee and by affirming the
opinion of the trial court, the Supreme Court gave observers every reason
to believe that the purpose prong of Section 5 was not, as Georgia argued,
limited to an intent to make things worse for minority voters, but was
instead as broad as the constitutional purpose standard. After all, the Supreme Court had made clear that summary affirmances "prevent lower
courts from coming to opposite conclusions on the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those actions."" '8 Thus, Busbee bound the
Section 5 trial courts and the Department of Justice when dealing with
comparable voting changes to reject the theory of retrogressive intent.
In 1987, the Supreme Court agreed to hear a case where a jurisdiction presented an "intent to retrogress" theory in City of Pleasant Grove v.
United States. 9 The factual context in this case was unusual. Pleasant
56.
Jurisdictional Statement at 1, Busbee v.Smith, 459 U.S. 1166 (1983) (No. 82857). Private appellees went so far as to characterize this argument as "frivolous" and
"without merit." Intervenor-Appellees Motion to Affirm at 31, 33, Busbee (No. 82-857)
("It ignores the plain language of the statute, the legislative history of the provision, [and]
the decisions of this Court.")
57.
The purpose prong of Section 5 was also key in the Supreme Court's decision
in the Port Arthur, Texas annexation case. City of Port Arthur, 459 U.S. 159, aff'g 517 F.
Supp. 987 (D.D.C. 1981). The City of Port Arthur, Texas had unsuccessfully sought preclearance of a series of annexations and consolidations, agreeing to switch from its at-large
system to a series of mixed plans that nevertheless still diluted African American voting
strength. 517 F. Supp. at 992-1008.The trial court found that the city's choices of election
methods at each stage were made with discriminatory intent. Id. at 991, 1011. By the time
the city's appeal reached the Supreme Court, the key remaining issue was whether Port
Arthur could retain a majority vote requirement for three at-large seats in a mixed election plan adopted in an effort to settle the case. 459 U.S. at 164-65. Because the runoff
requirement had initially been adopted with a discriminatory purpose and retained a dilutive effect, the Court decided that the discriminatory impact of the annexations and
consolidations had been insufficiently neutralized and was not entitled to preclearance. Id.
at 161-62; see also Blumstein, supra note 39, at 688; Pamela S. Karlan & Peyton McCrary,
Without Fear and Without Research:AbigailThernstrom on the Voting Rights Act, 4 J.L. & POL.
751,767-70 (1988).
58.
Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977).
59.
479 U.S. 462 (1987).
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Grove, Alabama, a virtually all-White city near Birmingham in industrial
Jefferson County, sought preclearance of a series of annexations. Its refusal
to annex nearby Black population concentrations was part of what the
trial court called "an astounding pattern of racial exclusion and discrimination in all phases of Pleasant Grove life," and as a result, the city had
remained an "all-white enclave in an otherwise racially mixed area of Alabama., 60 The annexations at issue provided61 further evidence of racial
discrimination in the city's annexation policy.
The city claimed that there could be no retrogressive effect to its
annexation policies because there were no Black people in the city, and
thus no one whose voting strength could be worsened.62 The Pleasant
Grove majority rejected this view, pointing out that "Section 5 looks not
only to the present effects of changes, but to their future effects as well,"
adding that the purpose requirement also applied to "anticipated as well as
present circumstances. 63 The city also argued that proof of discriminatory
intent without proof of discriminatory effect was insufficient to deny preclearance. The trial court gave short shrift to that argument.64 The
Supreme Court agreed: "Congress plainly intended that a voting practice
not be
precleared unless both discriminatory purpose and effect are ab6
sent. , 5
Pleasant Grove also argued that the purpose requirement of Section
5 was limited to retrogressive intent. In dissenting, Justice Lewis Powell,
joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, agreed: "[F]or a city to have a discriminatory purpose within
the meaning of the Voting Rights Act, it must intend its action to have a
60.
City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 568 F Supp. 1455, 1456 (D.D.C. 1983)
(denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment); see also City of Pleasant Grove v.
United States, 623 F Supp. 782, 784, 787-88 (D.D.C. 1985) (denying preclearance of the
annexations), aff'd, 479 U.S. 462 (1987).
61.
The evidence of intentional discrimination was so strong, noted the Supreme
Court, that "even if the burden of proving discrimination was on the United States, the
[trial] court 'would have had no difficulty in finding that the annexation policy of Pleasant
Grove is, by design, racially discriminatory in violation of the Voting Rights Act."' City of
Pleasant Grove, 479 U.S. at 467 n.7 (quoting 623 F Supp. at 788 n.30).
62.
Id. at 470-71.The dissenters also adopted this view. See id. at 475-76 (Powell, J.,
dissenting); see also THERNSTROM, supra note 20, at 156 ("It is difficult to see how Black
voting rights had been abridged by the boundary change, since Pleasant Grove had no
Black voters to begin with.").
63.
479 US.. at 471. The dissent by Justice Powell rejected this interpretation as
"purely speculative." Id. at 472 (Powell,J., dissenting).

64.
See City of Pleasant Grove, 623 F Supp. 782, 788 (D.D.C. 1985) ("[Tlhe city has
wholly failed to carry its burden of establishing that its annexation policy does not have
the purpose of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of color"); City of Pleasant Grove, 568 F Supp. at 1460 (holding that annexations are not entitled to preclearance
"if there is a discriminatory purpose irrespective of whether or not there is also a discriminatory effect").
65.
479 U.S. at 469 (quoting City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 172).
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retrogressive effect on the voting rights of Blacks. 6 6 The majority of the
Court, however, observed that it had rejected such reasoning since the
City of Richmond case. A change motivated by a racially discriminatory
purpose "has no legitimacy under our Constitution or under the statute,"
the Court had ruled then, "whatever its actual effect may have been or may
be.",67 In light of the outcome in Bossier II a dozen years later, it is ironic
that Justice Scalia joined the majority opinion in Pleasant Grove, and thus
rejected the retrogressive intent theory in favor of the constitutional pur68
pose standard used in previous Section 5 cases.
E. The "Clear Violation of Section 2" Rule
In 1980, the Supreme Court decided City of Mobile v. Bolden,69 a
Fourteenth Amendment challenge to that city's use of at-large elections.
The Court ruled that plaintiffs must prove not only that the at-large system has a discriminatory effect due to racially polarized voting, but also
that it was adopted or*maintained for the purpose of diluting minority
voting strength. 70 The Court remanded the case, and a companion suit
challenging at-large school board elections in Mobile County, for a new
trial on the intent question. The plaintiffs prevailed under the intent standard after demonstrating that
a racial purpose lay behind shifts to at-large
71
elections in 1876 and 1911.
66.
Id. at 474 (Powell,J., dissenting). For this propositionjustice Powell relied on his
majority opinion in City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 134 (1983) (discussing
Beer, 425 U.S. at 141), although discriminatory purpose was not even an issue at the Suprenre Court in either Beer or Lockhart.
67.
Id. at 471 n.11 (quoting City of Richmond, 422 U.S. at 378-79 (1975)) (emphasis
added).
68.
Justice Scalia appeared to treat the Section 5 and constitutional purpose standards as synonymous at least as late as 1991. In his dissenting opinion in a Louisiana
judicial election case, Chisom v.Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 416 (1991), he observed that Section
5 "is a means of assuring in advance the absence of all illegahty, not only that which violates the Voting Pights Act but that which violates the Constitution as well." He added
that "intentional discrimination ...whatever its form, is constitutionally prohibited, and
the preclearance provision of § 5 gives the Government a method by which to prevent
that:" Id. 416-17 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
69.
446 U.S. 55 (1980).
70.
Id. at 66-70. Although supported by only a plurality, Justice Potter Stewart's
opinion was the prevailing view on the Court. Not only did the opinion require proof of
intent, but it appeared to require a more difficult standard for inferring racial purpose
through circumstantial evidence. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had anticipated the
intent requirement in Nevett v.Sides, 571 E2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978); Bolden v. City of Mobile,
571 F2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978); Blacks United for Lasting Leadership v. City of Shreveport, 571
F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1978); and Thomasville Branch of NAACP v. Thomas County, 571 F2d 257
(5th Cir. 1978). See O'Rourke, supra note 34 at 56-57.
71.
Bolden v. City of Mobile, 542 E Supp. 1050 (S.D. Ala. 1982); Brown v. Bd. of
Sch. Comm'rs, 542 E Supp. 1078 (S.D. Ala. 1982); see also Peyton McCrary, History in the
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In the view of many observers, the Mobile decision was inconsistent
with the intent of Congress when it adopted and expanded the Voting
Rights Act in 1965, 1970, and 1975. A substantial majority in both houses
revised Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in 1982 to outlaw election
methods that result in diluting minority voting strength without requiring
a judicial finding of discriminatory intent.72 In creating a new statutory
means of attacking minority vote dilution, Congress cited the "totality of
circumstances" test of White and Zimmer as the evidentiary standard to be
used in applying the Section 2 results test. Vote-dilution cases previously
decided under the Fourteenth Amendment would henceforth be tried
under the new statutory standard 3
At that time, Congress did not revise the language of Section 5.
The legislative history provides some evidence that Congress believed an
objection would be required where the voting change would violate the
new Section 2 results standard. According to the 1982 Senate report, "In
light of the amendment to section 2, it is intended that a section 5 objection also follow if a new voting procedure itself so discriminates as to
violate section 2.'
Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy and Republican Representative James Sensenbrenner, two key sponsors of the revised statute, each
pointed to this language in the Senate Report during floor debates, interpreting it to mean that changes which violated Section 2 would now be
objectionable under Section 5 as well 6 Democratic Representative Don
Edwards, who chaired the subcommittee charged with drafting the House
bill and sponsored the final version of the revised Act, concurred in this
Courts: The Significance of City of Mobile v. Bolden, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, 47-63
(Chandler Davidson ed., 1984) (summarizing the testimony in both cases).
72.
See, e.g., Armand Derfner, Vote Dilution and the Voting Rights Act Amendments of
1982, in MINORITY VoTE DILUTION 148-49, 151-63 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984) (describing the 1982 revisions to Section 2); Parker, supra note 34, at 746-64; Thomas M.
Boyd & Stephen J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A Legislative
History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347 (1983) (providing the most detailed account of the
legislative actions and that led to the passage of the 1982 amendments).
73.
Laughlin McDonald, The Quiet Revolution in Minority Voting Rights, 42 VAtND. L.
REV. 1249, 1265 (1989); Blacksher & Menefee, supra note 34, at 31-32.
74.
In Bossier IJustice O'Connor, writing for the majority, treats this fact as dispositive evidence that Congress did not intend that preclearance be denied when a voting
change would violate Section 2: "Congress, among other things, renewed § 5 but did so
without changing its applicable standard.",520 U.S. at 484.
75.
S.Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong. 12 n.31 (1982). But see Bossier I, 520 U.S. at 484
(dismissing the significance of this expression of intent from the Senate Report: "We
doubt that Congress would depart from the settled interpretation of § 5 and impose a
demonstrably greater burden on the jurisdictions covered by § 5 ...by dropping a footnote in a Senate Report instead of amending the statute itself.").
76.
128 Cong. Rec. S7095 (daily ed. June 18, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy); id.
H3841 (June 23, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Sensenbrenner).The majority in Bossier I ignores
all evidence on this issue in the CongressionalRecord. See 520 U.S. 471,484 (1997).
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view. Congressional opponents of the 1982 amendments dispute this
711
view.
In 1985, the Department of Justice proposed the first revision of its
Section 5 guidelines following the 1982 amendments.7 9 As finally adopted,

a new provision required that preclearance be withheld where "a bar to
implementation of the change is necessary to prevent a clear violation of
amended Section 2." 80 This new test was relatively short-lived; a decade
later, the Supreme Court determined in Bossier I that preclearance could
not be denied simply because the proposed change would clearly violate
Section 2. 8' Nor was the new Section 2 test often the sole basis of an objection; the two principal reasons for objecting to voting changes
continued to be retrogressive effect and unconstitutional purpose.82

128 Cong. Rec. H3840-41 (June 23, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
Mark Haddad, Note, Getting Results Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 99
YALE L.J. 139, 150 (1984). However, two Georgia congressmen from metropolitan Atlanta,
Wyche Fowler and Elliott Levitas, asked Chairman Edwards during floor debate-without
referring in any way to the revised Section 2-whether Section 5 had been revised in any
way in the new bill, and he replied that it had not. 128 Cong. Rec. H3845-45 (June 23,
1982) (remarks of Rep. Edwards). The most plausible reading of this colloquy is that Rep.
Edwards believed he was responding to a question about the language of Section 5 itself,
which had not changed, rather than to the standard by which Section 5 was to be implemented under the revised Act. Moreover, it is hard to disagree with the observation of
Laughlin McDonald, Racial Fairness-Why Shouldn't It Apply to Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act?, 21 STET. L. REv. 847, 863 (1992), that "to the extent that there is a conflict between
the Senate Report and the statements of key sponsors of the bill (Senator Kennedy and
Representative Sensenbrenner) on the one hand, and the colloquies by Representatives
Fowler and Levitas on the other, the former clearly takes precedence over the latter."
79.
A proposed revision was published for comments on May 6, 1985. Procedures
for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 50 Fed. Reg. 19,122
(proposed May 6, 1985). Oversight hearings were then held on the proposed guidelines.
Proposed Changes to Regulations Governing Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong.
'(1985) [hereinafter Oversight Hearings]. Comments were received from 120 persons or
organizations, and the final version was published at 52 Fed. Reg. 486 (Jan. 6, 1987).
80.
Criticism in the oversight hearings focused on the Department's policy that, in
applying the new basis for objecting to voting changes, the burden of proof for determining whether the new voting procedure would "clearly" violate Section 2 lay with the
Department, not the submitting jurisdiction. Oversight Hearings, supra note 79, at 49, 14953, 167-71. On the other hand, two academic critics, Professors Timothy O'Rourke and
Katherine Butler, contended that the legislative history of the 1982 Act provided an insufficient basis for incorporating Section 2 in a Section 5 analysis at all, even with the
Department bearing the burden of proof. Id. at 35-38,63, 69-75.
81.
Bossier 1, 520 U.S. at 474,485.
82.
We base this observation on our own quantitative findings presented below. See
also Posner, supra note 6, at 84 (contending, for example, that in the 1990s, "only one [redistricting] objection relied exclusively on Section 2").
77.
78.
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CHANGING PATTERNS OF PURPOSE AND EFFECT

A. The Research Design
The central focus of the empirical research reported in Part II is to
assess the legal basis asserted for objections by the Department of Justice
between 1965 and the end of 1999. 83 The data we examine are 996 letters
interposing objections to voting changes in jurisdictions covered by the
preclearance requirements of the Act."4 Where a single letter included objections to changes affecting more than one governing body (e.g., both
school board and county commission in the same jurisdiction, or both
state house and state senate redistricting plans), we have treated this as two
objections. On the other hand, if a letter itemized objections to several
different features of a proposed change (e.g., objections to the use of atlarge elections, a numbered post requirement, staggered terms, and a majority vote requirement for a city council), we treated this as a single
objection where only a single governing body was involved.85
We divided voting changes into five basic groups: 1) ballot access; 2)
at-large elections and multi-member districts; 3) enhancing devices; 4)
redistrictings; 5) annexations and consolidations (see Table 1).86 Often, a
83.
For the discussion of legal standards in the current guidelines, see 28 C.FR. pt.
51, especially 28 C.ER. § 51.52, 28 C.FR. % 54-61. These legal standards were first set
forth in the Department's guidelines for administering the Act. Revision of Procedures for
Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 Fed. Reg. 486 (Jan. 6,
1987).
84.
As we noted at the outset, these objection letters, unlike court opinions regarding preclearance, do not set forth the full body of evidence on which the Department
relies in making each decision, and thus do not provide a basis for evaluating the accuracy
of the Department's fact-finding. We are not attempting to assess the accuracy of the Department's decision-making; we merely seek to identify the legal theory on which each
objection was based. The objection letters, which typically reflect the involvement of numerous analysts, reviewers, and decision makers, are not always models of clarity in
explanation, especially in the early 1970s. Our analysis of the legal basis asserted in each
letter is guided by the Department's Section 5 guidelines, the briefs filed by the parties in
Section 5 declaratory judgment actions, and by the Section 5 case law discussed in Part I.
The coding scheme was initially devised by Dr. McCrary. It was first implemented by Mr.
Seaman; Dr. McCrary then reviewed Mr. Seaman's coding decisions; the final decision on
each assessment was the responsibility of Dr. McCrary. Our coding decisions were, inevitably, based on textual interpretation. We believe that although knowledgeable observers
might disagree occasionally with our coding of individual objections, the patterns we
identify are beyond reasonable dispute.
85.
We are guided in this process by the "Complete Listing of Objections Pursuant
to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965," as listed on the Voting Section's website,
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2006). The observations
in this document are objection letters, which sometimes include two or even three governing bodies.
86.
We began with a larger number of initial categories, in order to determine
whether specific change types displayed unusual patterns over time. Because that proved
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letter included objections to more than one type of change, such as a decision to deny preclearance to both at-large elections and the use of
numbered posts."" When delineating the types of change that most frequently brought objections, the Department focuses on change types
rather than decisions to object. 8 Because we are trying to assess the legal
basis for objections, the observations in our tables are the number of times
the Department interposed an objection, except that where more than
one governing body is affected by the denial of preclearance, we count
each governing body as a separate observation.
We did not code an objection as one based on purpose unless the
letter cited at least some specific evidence of the sort set forth by the Supreme Court in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Corporation." Where the letter referred to the exclusion of minority group
members from the decision-making process, the refusal to accommodate
requests from the minority community, the awareness by decision-makers
that the adopted change would have a racially discriminatory effect, the
departure from standard decision-making procedures or criteria, or the
use of pretextual arguments to justify the change, we took that as
not to be the case, we aggregated the data for clarity of presentation. For example, requirements for numbered places, runofli, and staggered terms, as well as changes in the size
of the governing body and changes from appointive to elective procedures (or vice versa)
were all tallied separately, but were eventually collapsed into the category "enhancing devices." The category "annexations" includes deannexations and consolidations between
local jurisdictions. We put into the "ballot access" category all changes related to registration or voting, candidate qualification requirements, or the timing of referenda, primaries,
or other elections. The "at-large election" category includes multimember districts, as well
as the use of at-large seats, in mixed plans.
87.
For the period since January 1, 1980, these changes are identified in the Department's Submission Tracking and Processing System (STAPS). STAPS is a database used
to track the thousands of submissions (containing tens of thousands of changes) that the
Department receives annually, and provides, among other things, data on each voting
change submitted and the type of determination made. We have utilized STAPS only for
help in locating files.
88.
See, e.g., Attachments to the Statement of William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Rights Division (Attachment E-2: Number of Changes to Which
Objections Have Been Interposed by Type and Year from 1965-December 31, 1981),
reprinted in Hearings on the Voting Rights Act Before the Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution
of the Committee on theJudiciary, 97th Cong. 1784 (1982) (listing objections to 695 changes
resulting from 414 objections, according to Attachments D-1 and D-2). Attachment C-2
(Number of Changes Submitted and Reviewed ... by Type and Year from 1965December 31, 1981), lists 39,837 changes submitted for the same period. Id. at 1744-45.
Thus, during this period, objections were interposed to only 1.7 percent of all changes
submitted for preclearance.
89.
Our count is 1,074 objections to specific governing bodies from 1965 through
1999.
90.
429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977). In our view, Arlington Heights codified the standards employed in previous equal protection cases involving voting, beginning with Smith
v.Paris, 257 F Supp. 901 (M.D.Ala. 1966), modified and aft'd, 386 E2d 979 (5th Cir. 1967).

MichiganJournal of Race & Law

[VOL. 11:275

evidence that the objection was based on purpose. 9' This was especially
clear where
the letter indicated reliance on court decisions based in part
92
on intent.

The "effect" prong of Section 5 was also understood as synonymous
with the constitutional effect requirement before 1976, when the Supreme Court distinguished between the constitutional definition of effect
and statutory definition of effect under Section 5- defined as retrogressive effect-in Beer v. United States.9 We coded objections as based on a
retrogression standard when the Beer definition was satisfied, both before
and after the Supreme Court decision in that case.94 Where the letter
made clear that the objection was based on the change's discriminatory
effect-before Beer-but the effect did not appear retrogressive, we coded
it as simply an effect objection. 95
Some changes we viewed as per se retrogressive for purposes of this
analysis. For example, all changes from single member districts to at-large
elections would necessarily be retrogressive, assuming there was evidence
of racially polarized voting. 96 Changes from straight at-large elections to a
91.
This is consistent with the Department's approach. See 28 C.ER. § 51.57 (2004);
see also Posner, supra note 6 at 100-01. There is in most objection letters "boilerplate" language setting forth the legal burden of the jurisdiction to show that a change has neither
the purpose nor the effect of discriminating on the basis of race. Because such language
was included in the vast majority of letters, regardless of the actual basis for the objection,
we do not view such language as substantively significant.
92.
Key purpose-based decisions in Section 5 declaratory judgment actions included
Wilkes County v. United States, 450 F Supp. 1171 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd mem., 439 U.S. 999
(1978), and Busbee v. Smith, 549 F Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd mem., 459 U.S. 1166
(1982); also key were a Fourteenth Amendment redistricting case, Rybicki v. State Board of
Elections, 574 F Supp. 1082 (N.D. Ill. 1982), and a Section 2 decision based in part on the
purpose standard, Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 756 F Supp. 1298 (C.D. Cal. 1990), af'd,
918 F2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990).
93.
425 U.S. 130, 140-42 (1976); see also 28 C.FR. § 51.54(a) (2004).
94.
We recognize that this approach may seem ahistorical, by classifying pre-Beer
objections on a basis that the Department could not have had in mind (because the retrogression standard did not yet exist), but applying consistent definitions for the entire
period from 1968 through 1999 required this practice.
95.
A special problem arises where there is no clear benchmark for comparing the
new plan. See 28 C.ER. § 51.54(b)(4)(2004). As the Department's Section 5 Guidelines
indicate:
Where at the time of submission ... there exists no other lawful practice or
procedure for use as a benchmark (e.g., where a newly incorporated college
district selects a method of election) the Attorney General's preclearance determination will necessarily center on whether the submitted change was
designed or adopted for the purpose of discriminating against members of
racial or language minority groups.

Id.
96.
Recall that we are not assessing the accuracy of the Department's fact-finding, but
rather the legal basis for the objection.
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numbered place or residency district requirement, from a plurality rule to
a majority vote requirement, and from concurrent to staggered terms
were also treated as retrogressive. Annexations, deannexations, or consolidations were necessarily retrogressive as well, if objectionable, but could
be precleared where accompanied by a fairly drawn district election
plan. 9
In the 1980s, after Congress amended Section 2 of the Act to create
a statutory results test, the Department revised its guidelines to require
objections where the new practice at issue would clearly violate the new
results test. 98 Where objection letters specifically used language referring
to a "clear violation of Section 2," we identified this as a third type of
Section 5 effects test.99 The Department's letter often provided evidence
of racial purpose as well as retrogressive effect or a clear violation of Section 2; where that was true, we coded the objection as having two legal
bases (both purpose and effect).
On occasion, voting changes were found objectionable because they
would violate the minority language protections of the Act.'00 Finally,
some objections were based on the failure of the submitting authority to
provide the information necessary to determine whether the change was
entitled to preclearance. These were considered technical objections, and
the change was often precleared once the jurisdiction supplied the necessary evidence.'0T

97.
28 C.ER. § 51.61(c) (2004) (following City of Richmond, 422 U.S. 358).
98.
Revision of Procedures for Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, 52 Fed. Reg. 486 (Jan. 6,1987) (codified at 28 C.ER. § 51.55(b)(2) (2004)) (barring implementation of any voting change that would constitute "a clear violation of
amended Section 2"); see also supra Part I.G. Even before the 1987 revision of the Guidelines, some objections to redistricting plans were based on this reasoning. See, e.g., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Objection Letter to Oktibbeha County, Mississippi (June 17, 1983); U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Objection Letter to Amite County, Mississippi (June 6, 1983); U.S. Dep't
ofJustice, Objection Letter to Copiah County, Mississippi (April 11, 1983).
99.
In Bossier I, the Supreme Court ruled that this was an improper basis for objections. 520 U.S. 471; see supra text accompanying notes 77-83. In some cases, language in
the objection letters referencing Section 2 this language appeared to be no more than

"boilerplate," restating the requirements of 28 C.ER. 5 51.55(b)(2). Initially we were inclined to view this language as substantively insignificant, as we did with similar
boilerplate references to the Section 5 purpose requirement. Discussions with present and
formerVoting Section attorneys persuaded us, however, that this boilerplate language was
used only when the fact that the proposed plan would clearly violate Section 2 played at
least some role in the decision to object. Consequently, we coded all letters that referred to
Section 2 of the Act as falling under this category.
100.
28 C.ER. § 51.55(a) (2004).
101.
28 C.ER. % 51.40,51.52(c) (2004).
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B. The Changing Legal Basis of Objections

To grasp the larger patterns at work in the Department's objection
decisions, a few simple quantitative observations are necessary. Table 1
summarizes the types of voting changes to which objections have been
interposed, by decade. The percentage of objections for each category was
relatively stable over time, except that at-large elections and enhancing
devices accounted for a much higher proportion of objectionable changes
in the first decade (1968-1979) than subsequently, and objections to districting plans
were proportionally lower in the first decade and higher
0 2
thereafter.
TABLE I
CHANGE TYPES TO WHICH OBJECTIONS WERE INTERPOSED

Change Type
Annexations
At-large
Enhancing Devices
Districting
Ballot Access
Other Changes
Totals

1970s

%

1980s

%

1990s

%

TOTALS

34
110
182
86
77
9
498

7%
22%
37%
17%
15%
2%
100%

47
57
93
165
64
5
431

11%
13%
22%
38%
15%
1%
100%

24
31
73
209
56
9
402

6%
8%
18%
52%
14%
2%
100%

105
198
348
460
197
23
1331

Note: In this and the following tables, the column headed "1970s" is actually
the period 1968-1979, but few objections were interposed until 1970. The
number of change types to which objections were interposed is greater than
the total number of objections, because numerous objection decisions affected two or more change types.

During the 1970s, at-large elections and enhancing devices together
were denied preclearance 292 times, 59 percent of all objectionable
changes, but only 86 redistricting plans (17 percent) were the subject of
objections (see Table 1). By the 1980s, the picture presented by Table 1 is
more mixed: the Department interposed objections to 150 at-large election plans and enhancing devices (35 percent of objectionable changes)
and denied preclearance to 165 redistricting plans (38 percent). In the
1990s, at-large elections and enhancing devices were the subject of objections only 104 times, 26 percent of objectionable changes, but the
Department denied preclearance to a striking 209 redistricting plans (52
percent)-over half of all changes to which objections were interposed
(see Table 1). The increasing proportion of objections due to redistricting
plans was, to some extent, a direct consequence of the decline in the
102.
Note that the data presented in Table I are the number of change types to
which objections were interposed, and are somewhat more numerous than objection decisions (the data presented in Table 2).
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number of at-large systems resulting from earlier Departmental objections.
The most striking characteristic of our findings regarding the legal
basis of the Department's decisions to object (see Table 2) is the consistent
increase over time of objections based on the purpose prong of Section 5,
and the consistent decline of objections based on retrogression. During
the 1970s the Department rarely cited intent in its objection letters. We
identified only 9 objections (Just 2 percent) as based entirely on purpose,
and only 22 more (6 percent) were based on a combination of intent and
retrogressive effect. The vast majority of the objections (297, or 77 percent) were based on retrogression.
TABLE 2
LEGAL BASES FOR OBJECTION DECISIONS BY DECADE

Legal Bases

1970s

%

1980s

%

1990s

%

Totals

Intent

9

2%

83

25%

151

43%

243

Dilution

34

9%

....

Retrogression
Technical

297
17

77%
4%

146
15

44%
5%

73
1

21%
0%

516
33

Exclusive Categories
34

Section 2

--

2

1%

6

2%

8

Minority Languages

2

1%

2

1%

5

1%

9

Intent/Retrogression

22

6%

73

22%

67

19%

162

Intent/Dilution

5

1%

.-

Intent/Section 2

--

12%

47

Combined Categories

Other

6

--

Totals

386

100%

5

.

2%

41

3

1%

5

1%

8

330

100%

349

100%

1065

The high percentage of objections attributed to the retrogression
standard in the 1970s is, to some extent, an artifact of our need to apply a
consistent coding scheme for all letters between 1968 and 1999.104 Based
on the need for consistency, we treated all changes as retrogressive if they
satisfied the standard set forth in Beer v. United States.10 Where the letter
referred to the dilutive effect of a change that did not, however, make

103.
A small number fell into the category of a technical objection, where the jurisdiction failed to supply the information required by the Department's guidelines, making a
proper assessment of the change impossible. Although always small in number, technical
objections were more common in the 1970s and in the 1980s (4 percent), but virtually
disappeared by the 1990s.
104.
See supra note 94.
105.
425 U.S. 130 (1976). Based on our reading of the letters, we think that before
Beer the Department understood the effect prong of Section 5 to be identical to the constitutional effect standard.

MichiganJournal of Race & Law

[VOL. 11:275

6
matters worse for minority voters, we classified the change as dilutive. 10
There were only 34 such non-retrogressive but dilutive plans, 9 percent of
the redistricting objections in the 1970s.
By the 1980s, 83 objections (25 percent) were based entirely on the
intent requirement, and another 73 (22 percent) were seen as both retrogressive and purposefully discriminatory. Only 146 objections (44
percent) relied on the retrogression standard alone. A new basis for objecting was available in the 1980s, when it was possible to object because the
proposed change presented a clear violation of the new Section 2 results
test. In our judgment, however, the Department only interposed two objections (one percent) on this basis alone in the 1980s, and only 73 letters
(22 percent) cited both purpose and Section 2.107
In the 1990s, fully 151 objections (43 percent) were based on purpose alone. In contrast, retrogression alone was the basis for only 73
objections (21 percent), and only six objections relied entirely on Section
2. Another 67 objections (19 percent) relied on a combination of purpose
and retrogression, and 41 (12 percent) on both purpose and the need to
comply with Section 2. Thus, the intent prong was involved in a remarkable 74 percent of all objections in that decade. In contrast, a
determination of retrogressive effect was involved in only 40 percent of
objections in the 1990s and Section 2 in only 14 percent.

TABLE

3:

LEGAL BASES FOR OBJECTION DECISIONS, REDISTRICTING

Legal Bases
Exclusive Categones
Intent

1970s

%

1980s

%

1990s

%

Totals

75

46%

122

58%

204

7

11%

Dilution

23

27%

---

Retrogression
Technical

37
10

40%
12%

35
9

21%
5%

20
1

10%
0%

92
20

Section 2

--

1

1%

1

0%

2

Combined Categoies
Intent/Retrogression
Intent/Dilution

5
2

40

24%

34

16%

79
2

Intent/Section 2
Other

Totals

7%
2%

23

2%

4
--

2%

2

30
1

14%
0%

34
3

86

101%

164

99%

209

98%

459

--

Note:Totals do not always equal 100%, due to rounding

106.
The classic example would be the New Orleans redistricting plan at issue in
Beer, to which the Department had objected under the effect standard. All nonretrogressive changes seen by the Department as having an objectionable effect were seen
as dilutive; all objections in the ballot access category were retrogressive.
107.
In both the 1980s and 1990s, the content of those letters citing both purpose
and Section 2 concerns suggested that the purpose issue was usually the more important
concern.
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Looking just at objections to redistricting plans, we observe similar
patterns (see Table 3). Objections based on purpose alone increased from
7 (11 percent) in the 1970s to 75 (46 percent) during the next decade,
and 122 (58 percent) in the 1990s.The intent prong, in combination with
retrogression, was involved in only 5 redistricting objections in the 1970s,
but increased to 40 objections (24 percent) in the 1980s, while sagging to
33 redistricting objections (16 percent) in the 1990s. Although inconsequential in the 1980s, the combination of intent and Section 2 concerns
provided the basis for 30 objections (14 percent) of redistricting objections in the 1990s. The principal difference between redistricting
objections and objections as a whole was that a substantially lower proportion of redistricting objections were based on retrogression than was
the case for objections as a whole. In the 1970s, only 37 redistricting plans
(40 percent) were retrogressive (see Table 3), as compared with 297 (77
percent) for all objections (see Table 2). In the 1980s, 35 redistricting plans
were rejected on retrogression grounds (21 percent), but retrogression was
the basis for 146 objections (44 percent) for all change types (see Tables 2
and 3). In the 1990s, retrogression provided the basis for 20 redistricting
objections (only 10 percent), but 73 (21 percent) for all change types (see
Tables 2 and 3).
These results make clear that the likely effect of striking down the
Department's authority to object to voting changes when they present a
clear violation of Section 2 was inconsequential.1 0 8 On the other hand, the
effect of redefining purpose under Section 5 as extending only so far as an
"intent to retrogress" was potentially to reduce the number of objections
substantially from the level found in the 1990s. 0 9
III. How

THE SUPREME COURT TRANSFORMED SECTION

5

A. The Bossier Parish Litigation: ProceduralHistory
The litigation used by the Supreme Court to reinterpret Section 5
case law arose from the Department's objection to a school board redistricting plan in Bossier Parish, Louisiana. Louisiana parishes elect their
governing bodies, called police juries, and their parish school boards as
well, by districts rather than at-large elections."0 In the 1980s Bossier

Bossier 1,520 U.S. at 485.
108.
Bossier II, 528 U.S. at 328.
109.
A police jury is a unit of local Louisiana government similar to a county board
110.
of supervisors. See O'Quinn v. Manuel, 773 E2d 605, 606 n.1 (5th Cir. 1985) (discussing
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 5 33:1236). In 1968, the Louisiana legislature authorized police juries
and school boards to use at-large elections for the first time. Following Allen, the Department ofJustice objected to both enactments and to numerous efforts by particular parishes
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Parish used different election plans for police jury and school board; neither had a single Black-majority district."' Although Blacks made up 20
percent of the parish population and 18 percent of its voting age population, the school board had never elected an African American."12 After the
1990 census, both bodies displayed wide population disparities among
their twelve single-member districts and thus required redistricting. ' 13 The
police jury quickly redistricted and secured preclearance of its plan. Although the new plan had no Black-majority districts, this characteristic
had also been true of the police jury plan in the 1980s and the change
was thus not retrogressive. When the Department precleared the police
jury plan, it was not aware of evidence potentially showing an intent to
dilute minority voting strength."1 4 However, it was aware that, unlike the
school board, the police jury had elected-and reelected-a Black candidate under the existing plan."'
The school board refused initially to adopt this plan, in part because
it did not appear to serve the interests of the school board. The plan was
drawn to protect incumbent members of the police jury and would pit
two sets of school board incumbents against one another. The police jury
plan also reflected that body's functional concerns such as road maintenance and drainage, and would create several open districts.'1 6 It had an
unusually high deviation from population equality, and, as the dissenting
justices later pointed out, four districts "failed the standard measure of
compactness used by the Board's own cartographer.""11 7 The school board
engaged the same consultant to draw a separate plan, anticipating the
likely need to realign precinct boundaries. In the meantime, local Black

to adopt at-large elections. 393 U.S. 544; DAVID HUNTER, THE SHAMEFUL BLIGHT: THE SUR-

148-49, 208-09 (1972).
McCrary, Bringing Equality to Power: How the Federal Courts Transformed the Electoral Structure
of Southern Politics, 1960-1990, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 665, 671-73 (2003) (providing direct
evidence that in the 1960s, Louisiana legislators saw at-large elections as a key device for
diluting African American voting strength).
VIVAL OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN VOTING IN THE SOUTH

111.

Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. v. Reno, 907 F Supp. 434,437 (D.D.C. 1995).
112.
Id.
113.
Bossier I, 520 U.S. at 474.
114.
The parties in Bossier stipulated that the police jury failed to provide the Department with information then available to the parish, showing that two reasonably
compact Black-majority districts could be drawn, and failed to inform the Department
that local Black citizens had protested their exclusion from the redistricting process.J.S. at
68a-69a, 76a, 82a-83a, 87a, Bossier Parish I (Nos. 95-1455 and 95-1508).
115.
907 F Supp. at 437. The district included an air force base, whose largely White
residents rarely voted in local elections, so that Blacks approached parity with Whites in
voter turnout. Id.
116.
Bossier II, 528 U.S. at 346-47 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see also Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 907 E Supp. 458 (Kessler, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part);J.S. at 72a-73a, 102a, 112a, Bossier I (Nos. 95-1455 and 95-1508).
117.
Bossier II, 528 U.S. at 346.
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leaders proposed an alternative plan with two Black-majority districts."8
At that point the school board put aside its reservations and adopted the
police jury plan, which it submitted for p'reclearance." 9 On August 30,
1993, the Department ofJustice objected to the plan because the plan was
adopted with a discriminatory purpose and posed a clear violation of Section 2.120
The school board then filed a Section 5 declaratory judgment action
in the District of Columbia.' 2' The three-judge panel precleared the plan
by a 2-1 majority, with Judge Laurence Silberman writing the opinion of
the court.12 2 The majority opinion focused on the claim that a plan that
clearly violates Section 2 is not entitled to preclearance. The Court forcefully rejected this interpretation of Section 5, treating the Department's
view of the Section 2 issue as evidence to support the allegation-by now
endorsed by the Supreme Court in Miller v.Johnson 23 -that it sought to
use Section 5 to maximize Black voting strength. 24' Judge Gladys Kessler
dissented, however, asserting that under Arlington Heights the evidence in
the case "demonstrates convincingly that the Bossier School Board acted
with discriminatory purpose. ' "26s This view was later echoed by the dissenters on the Supreme Court.1
118.
Id. at 347-48.
119.
Id. at 349.
120.
U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Objection to Bossier Parish School Board, Louisiana (Aug.
30, 1993); see also U.S. Dep't of Justice, Letter to Bossier Parish School Board, Louisiana
(Dec. 20, 1993) (declining to withdraw the objection). Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,
writing for the majority in Bossier I, observed that the Department's objection letter "asserted that the Board's plan violated § 2 of the Act," relying on 28 C.FR. 51.55(b)(2). 520
U.S. at 475-76. This seems an incomplete characterization. We read the objection letter as
asserting that the school board failed to demonstrate that its redistricting plan was adopted
without a racially discriminatory purpose, largely because the letter summarized at some
length the background of the board's decision in a manner suggesting an Arlington Heights
analysis of intent, and merely noted in a single sentence--a sentence that could be characterized as "boilerplate" language in the Department's objection letters-that the new plan
also presented a clear violation of Section 2.
121.
Black leaders from Bossier Parish, represented by the Lawyers' Committee for
Civil Rights Under Law, intervened in the lawsuit as defendants. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd.,
907 F Supp. at 436.
122.
Id. at 450.
123.
515 U.S. 900 (1995).
124.
Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 907 F Supp. at 440-41, 444-45, 449-50. Judge Silberman
associated the Department's alleged "maximization" policy with its application of Section
2, not the purpose prong of Section 5.
125.
Id. at 454 (Kessler, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part) (pointing out
that the majority never even cited Arlington Heights). The majority viewed the intent evidence quite differently, in part because it treated much of the factual evidence presented
by the defendants as part of its purpose case as relevant only to the Section 2 analysis. Id.
at 445, 447-49.
126.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Souter observed that, under the traditional
Section 5 purpose analysis, the evidence regarding the redistricting plan for the Bossier
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Although on appeal the Supreme Court vacated the lower court decision and remanded for reconsideration, it agreed with the lower court's
view of the effects prong. 127Writing for a 5-4 majority,Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor announced that preclearance could not be denied to a voting
change on the ground that the new system would violate Section 2.128 In
considering the purpose prong of Section 5, however, Justice O'Connor
introduced a theory not previously advanced by the school board and not
considered by the trial court-the assertion by the dissenters in City of
Pleasant Grove v. United States129 that under Section 5 a purpose inquiry is
restricted to the question of retrogressive intent; that is, whether the
change was designed not merely to13discriminate
against minority voters
0
but to make matters worse for them.
On this issue Bossier Parish took the same view of the purpose
prong as the United States and private intervenors.13 1 In fact, at oral argument the school board's veteran attorney, Michael Carvin, explicitly
rejected the suggestion that, as one justice put it, "the only purpose that is
relevant under Section 5 is purpose to cause retrogression, as distinct from
purpose to discriminate by effecting a purposeful dilution. 132 Carvin's
response was: "Oh, no. No, not at all. I think that decision, the Court's

Parish School Board "disqualifies it from § 5 preclearance." Bossier II, 528 U.S. at 356-57
(Souter, J., dissenting). "There is no reasonable doubt on this record that the Board chose
the Police Jury plan for no other reason than to squelch requests to adopt the NAACP
plan or any other plan reflecting minority voting strength." Id.
127.
Bossier 1,520 U.S. at 474.
128.
Id. at 485.
129.
479 U.S. 462.
130.
Bossier 1,520 U.S. at 479.
131.
See Brief of Appellee Bossier Parish at 10, Bossier I (Nos. 95-1455 & 95-1508)
("[T]his Court, in just the past two Terms, has already squarely rejected the notion that a
Section 5 objection can be premised on any grounds other than an invidious purpose or
retrogressive effect."), available at 1996 WL 531765; see also Bossier 1, 520 U.S. at 479 (noting
that the Court has "squarely held that a Section 5 objection was warranted only if a redistricting change is retrogressive or has a discriminatory purpose sufficient to violate the
Constitution") (emphases added); Brief of Federal Appellant at 35, Bossier I (Nos. 98-405
and 98-406) ("Preclearance should be denied to a voting change when it is known that
the change will result in the unlawful dilution of minority voting strength, regardless of
whether the change was instituted for a discriminatory purpose or had a retrogressive
effect."), available at 1996 WIL 439256. In fact, the "retrogressive intent" argument that the
five-justice majority found so persuasive in Bossier II was advanced only in a petition to
file a late amicus curiae brief on behalf of several covered counties in Texas in Bossier I. See
Motion for Counties to File Brief Amicus Curiae at 3, Bossier I (Nos. 98-405 and 98-406)
(arguing that Section 5 is limited "to only those circumstances in which the purpose or
effect of the change is to cause a retrogression in the electoral position of minority voters"), available at 1997WL 143493.
132.
See Oral Argument at 30, Bossier I (Nos. 95-1455, 95-1508), available at 1996 WL
718469.
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decision
in Richmond and Pleasant Grove has already decided that is,,133
sue.

Despite the fact that no previous court had ever restricted the Section 5 purpose requirement in this way, the conservative majority in
Bossier I remanded the case in order for the trial court to consider
whether the evidence it had previously excluded was relevant to determining whether the Bossier Parish school board acted with an "intent to
retrogress" in adopting its redistricting plan. 34 As Justice O'Connor ormnously put it, "we leave open for another day the question whether the
§ 5 purpose inquiry ever extends beyond the search for retrogressive intent.", 35
B. The Legal Gymnastics 36 ofBossier II
When the case returned to the Supreme Court on appeal, Justice
Antonin Scalia, writing for the same five-justice majority, answered Justice
O'Connor's question with an emphatic "No": "In light of the language of
§ 5 and our prior holding in Beer, we hold that § 5 does not prohibit preclearance of a redistricting plan enacted with a discriminatory but
nonretrogressive purpose. -,137
Explaining how the conservative majority reached this remarkable
conclusion, which appears to us at odds with all previous court interpretations of Section 5 since the inception of the Voting Rights Act, requires
careful attention to Justice Scalia's language, the language of Section 5 of
the Act, the language of the Beer decision, and the context within which
each of the above was penned.
1. Misapplying Legislative History
Justice Scalia began with the key language in Section 5: a covered
jurisdiction has the burden of proving that the proposed change "does not
have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the

133.
Id. at 30-31 As Carvin pointed out, since the parties stipulated that the plan was
not retrogressive, "you can obviously assume that they didn't have the purpose to retrogress," and had the purpose issue been restricted to intent to retrogress, the district court's
decision "would have been a one-paragraph opinion." Id. at 31.
134.
Bossier 1,
520 U.S. at 486.
135.
Id. Justice O'Connor added that the lower court was to determine as well
whether the school board acted with a "nonretrogressive, but nevertheless discriminatory,
'purpose,' "and whether such evidence was "relevant" to a Section 5 analysis. Id.
136.
See Bossier II, 528 U.S. at 371 (SouterJ., dissenting) (using the term "gymnastic"
to characterize the majority's effort to reconcile its opinion in Bossier II with the majority
opinion in City of Pleasant Grove, 479 U.S. 462).
137.
Id. at 341.
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right to vote on account of race or color."'' 3 Much of his analysis hinged
on the definitions given to the words "purpose" and "effect" in this sentence, as well as to the meaning of the phrase "denying or abridging the
right to vote." The starting point for Justice Scalia's analysis of the text
was, however, the definition attached to the word "effect" in Beer.
Reasoning that § 5 must be read in light of its purpose of"insur[ing] that no voting-procedure changes would be made that
would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral
franchise," we held [in Beer] that "a legislative reapportionment
that enhances the position of racial minorities ... can hardly
have the 'effect' of diluting or abridging the right to vote on
account of race within the meaning of Section 5. '
If the term "effect" means retrogression, as the Beer majority had determined in 1976, then injustice Scalia's view the definition of "purpose"
under Section 5 must also be tied to the concept of retrogression because
"we refuse to adopt a construction that would attribute different meanings to the same phrase ["denying or abridging"] in the same sentence,
depending on which object it is modifying."'140 Under this reading the
burden of the covered jurisdiction is to prove that: 1) the change will not
have a retrogressive effect; and 2) the change was not adopted with the
intent of achieving a retrogressive effect.
Justice Scalia's interpretation of the text of Section 5 hinges upon a
word-retrogression-that does not appear in the text of the statute at all,
but was coined by the Beer majority based on its reading of a congressional committee report. 4' This is an odd approach for a Justice who
professes to disdain legislative history and "object[s] to [its] use ... on
principle,"4 2 and who believes that the Court should generally ignore
legislative history, except in the rare situation where the statutory text is

138.
Id. at 328 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973c).
139.
Id. at 329 (quoting Beer, 425 U.S. at 141).
140.
Id. (relying on Bankamerica Corp. v. United States, 462 US. 122, 129 (1983),
which declined to give different meanings to the phrase "other than" when it modified
"banks" and "common carriers" in the same clause). "Justice Scalia determines what statutory text means by presuming authorship by an ideal drafter who meets proper standards
of style and grammar," points out legal scholar William D. Popkin, and "his resort to internal context in statutory interpretation has very little to do with how people ordinarily use

the language." Popkin, An "Internal" Critique ofJustice Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1133, 1143 (1992).
141.
H.R. Rep. No. 94-106, at 60 (1975).
142.
Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL CoURTs AND THE LAW 3,31 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
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absurd on its face.1 43 Justice Scalia has strenuously dissented from the use
of legislative committee reports as valid evidence in interpreting statutes,14 and has even gone so far as to write separate concurring opinions
with the sole purpose of disavowing
or disparaging legislative history re4
1
lied upon by the majority.
The Beer majority's use of legislative history-on which Justice
Scalia relies in Bossier IH-illustrates the sort of behavior that ordinarily
triggers Justice Scalia's disdain. The Court relied for its assessment of congressional intent on a passage from 'the 1975 House Report,146 a
characterization of the purpose of Section 5 reprinted verbatim from a
little-known 1972 oversight committee report evaluating the preclearance
review of Mississippi's voter reregistration program. 147 In the introduction
to the 1972 oversight report we are cautioned that "[t]he subcommittee
has given detailed consideration to the administration and enforcement of
the Voting Rights Act in Mississippi during 1971 when 26 counties in
Mississippi undertook to reregister voters," and as a result "[t]he observations and conclusions contained within this report are based upon and
limited to that study.' 148 To us, this appears a slim basis for an assessment of
legislative intent in 1965, or later, as neither this 1972 subcommittee nor
any congressional committee in 1975 ever made a systematic investigation
of the legislative history of Section 5 as originally adopted or revised.
The idea that the 1965 Congress saw the preclearance requirement
as limited to retrogression strikes critics as thoroughly counterintuitive. As
Justice Breyer pointed out in dissenting from Justice Scalia's Bossier II
analysis, there were some jurisdictions in 1965 where "historical discrimination had left the number of Black voters at close to zero," and as a result
143.
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rav. 621, 651,
n.116 (1990) (collecting cases where Justice Scalia has objected to the use of legislative

history).
144.
See, e.g., Bank One Chi. N.A., v. Midwest Bank & Trust, 516 U.S. 264, 279-80
(1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S.
511, 519 (1993) (Scalia,J., concurring) (stating that Court should not have consulted legislative history once it concluded that statute was unambiguous and unequivocal because
"that is not merely a waste of research time and ink; it is a false and disruptive lesson in the
law"); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191-92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("Committee reports, floor speeches, and even colloquies between Congressmen ... are
frail substitutes for bicameral vote upon the text of a law and its presentment to the President."). Scalia's disdain for committee reports predates his appointment to the Supreme
Court. See Hirschey v. FERC, 777 E2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment).
145.
See Thomas W Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72
WASH. U. L. Q. 351, 365 (1994) (noting "Justice Scalia's practice of refusing to join any
part of another Justice's opinion that relies on legislative history").
146.
H.R. Rep. No. 94-106, at 60 (1975).
147.
Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in Mississippi: Hearing Before the Civil
Rights Oversight Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,92nd Cong. 14 (1972).
148.
Id. at iii (emphasis added).
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"retrogression would have proved virtually impossible where § 5 was
needed most.' 49 As an example he pointed to Forrest County, Mississippi,
where as of 1962 only one percent of the Black voting-age population
was registered to vote, due to the discriminatory application of the state's
registration requirements.,5 When the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals enjoined the registrar from discriminatory processing of registration
the state legislature enacted a
applications, Justice Breyer observed,'
"good moral character requirement," which the Supreme Court characterized as "an open invitation to abuse at the hands of voting officials."''
As Justice Breyer wryly noted, this change "would result in maintainingthough not, in light of the absence of Blacks from the Forrest County voting rolls, in increasing-white political supremacy,'', 3 and thus, under the
majority's reading of the Section 5 purpose requirement, an intentionally
discriminatory change would have been entitled to preclearance.
Both Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer emphasized that it was not
necessary to overrule Beer to retain the meaning attached to the Section 5
purpose requirement for the past quarter century.5 4Justice Stevens would
have deferred to the reading placed upon the language of the statute by
the Department of Justice, in which the term "purpose" refers, quite simply, to the constitutional standard:
The reading above makes clear that there is no necessary tension between the Beer majority's interpretation of the word
"effect" in § 5 and the Department's consistent interpretation
of the word "purpose." For even if retrogression is an acceptable standard for identifying prohibited effects, that assumption
does not justify an interpretation of the word "purpose" that is

149.
Bossier I,528 U.S. at 374 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
150.
Id. at 374-75 (relying on United States v.Mississippi, 229 E Supp. 925, 994, n.86
(S.D. Miss. 1964) (dissenting opinion), rev'd, 380 US. 128 (1965), and United States v.Lynd,
301 F2d 818,821 (5th Cir. 1972)).
Id. at 375 (citing Lynd, 301 E2d at 821).
151.
152.
Id. (quoting South Carolina v.Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 313 (1966)). To Justice
Breyer:
[i]t seems obvious, then, that if Mississippi had enacted its 'moral character'
requirement in 1966 (after enactment of the Voting Rights Act), a court applying § 5 would have found 'the purpose ;.. of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race,' even if Mississippi had intended to permit,
say, 0.4%, rather than 0.3%, of the Black voting age population of Forrest
County to register.
Id. at 376.
153.
Id. at 375.
154.
Id. at 373--74.
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at war with both controlling precedent and the plain meaning
of the statutory text. '
On the other hand, if Beer were wrongly decided, and thus the novelty of defining discriminatory effect as limited to retrogression were not
an issue, then the conflicted syntax that troubled Justice Scalia in Bossier
1156 would not arise. Justice Souter, a staunch advocate of stare decisis in
interpreting statutory language-"when statutory language is construed it
should stay construed"-flatly declared that "Beer was wrongly decided. '1 57 "The Court was mistaken in Beer when it restricted the effect
prong of § 5 to retrogression, and the Court is even more wrong today
when it limits the clear text of § 5 to the corresponding retrogressive
purpose. ' 58
2. Misinterpreting the Purpose Prong
In our view, another major problem with Justice Scalia's interpretation of the Section 5 purpose requirement is its handling of the language
from Beer that could only be referring to a second prong of Section 5-the
"purpose" prong plainly stated in the text of the statute. An ameliorative
change, according to Beer, "cannot violate § 5 unless the new apportionment itself so discriminates on the basis of race or color as to violate the
Constitution.""9 The United States argued in Bossier II that the phrasing of
this "unless" clause clearly meant that the purpose requirement under
Section 5 was the same as the intent standard under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 60 Justice Scalia rejected this view as "a most implausible
155.
156.
157.

Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
Id. at 329.
See id. at 362-63 (SouterJ., dissenting). As Justice Souter notes in his dissent:
Although I adhere to the strong policy of respecting precedent in statutory
interpretation and so would not reexamine Beer, that policy does not demand that recognized error be compounded indefinitely, and the Court's
prior mistake about the meaning of the effects requirement of § 5 should not
be expanded by an even more erroneous interpretation of the scope of the
section's purpose prong.

Id. at 342.
158.
Id. at 342; see also id. at 363 (Souter,J., dissenting) ("But it is another thing entirely to ignore error in extending discredited reasoning to previously unspoiled statutory
provisions ... [as] the Court does in extending Beer from § 5 effects to S 5 purpose.").
159.
425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) (emphasis added). Substantially the same wording is
used elsewhere in the decision: "It is possible that a legislative reapportionment could be a
substantial improvement over its predecessor in terms of lessening racial discrimination,
and yet nonetheless continue so to discriminate on the basis of race or color as to be unconstitutional." Id. at 141 n.14.
160.
See, e.g., Brief for the Federal Appellant at 28-32, Bossier If (Nos. 98-405 and 98406); Reply Brief of the Federal Appellant at 6-8, Bossier II (Nos. 98-405 and 98-406).
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interpretation" on the grounds that "at the time Beer was decided, it had
not been established that discriminatory purpose as well as discriminatory
effect was necessary for a constitutional violation.' ' 6' He pointed out that
the Court had not yet decided Washington v. Davis,162 where the Court
ruled that evidence of discriminatory effect, without proof of discriminatory intent, is insufficient to prove a constitutional violation. 6 3 BeerJustice
Scalia contended, cannot 64
be interpreted as "anticipating (Without argument) that later holding.'
In short, Justice Scalia contended that the Beer majority had understood the constitutional standard for evaluating vote dilution to be the
standard set forth in White v. Regester,161 which he characterized as a simple
effects test not requiring proof of discriminatory intent. 66 That interpretation seems to us to contradict the Court's view of this issue three years
earlier in Bossier 1.67 As Justice O'Connor put it in 1997, even if one assumes that the standard for proving a constitutional violation at the time
Beer was decided was a simple dilutive effect test, "it is no longer valid
today because the applicable statutory and constitutional standards have
changed ....Since 1980, a plaintiff bringing a constitutional vote dilution
challenge, whether under the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment, has
been required to establish that the State or political subdivision acted with

a discriminatory purpose.,,168

Under this view, even if the "unless" clause in Beer did not refer to
discriminatory purpose in 1976, it had to be construed as requiring evi-

161.
Bossier II, 528 U.S. at 337. "If the statement in Beer had meant what appellants
suggest,"-that is, referring to a Section 5 purpose requirement identical to the purpose
standard under the Equal Protection clause-it would "have been gutting Beer's holding,"

because under the appellants' interpretation "a showing of discriminatory but nonretrogressive effect would have been a constitutional violation and would, despite the holding of
Beer, have sufficed to deny preclearance." Id. Contrary to Justice Scalia's characterization,
the appellants actually argued that the "unless" clause in Beer referred to discriminatory but
nonretrogressive purpose, not dilutive effect. Id.
162.
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
163.
Id. Davis was decided less than three months later, however, at the end of the
term.
164.

165.

Bossier II, 528 U.S. at 337.

412 U.S. 755 (1973).

166.
Bossier II, 528 U.S. at 337.The Court could hardly have intended its reference to
a constitutional violation to mean that a voting change that was dilutive in effect under
White v. Regester-but not retrogressive-would be objectionable under Section 5. In announcing the retrogression test, the Beer majority made clear that the dilutive effect
standard was inapplicable in the Section 5 context.
167.
Bossier 1,520 U.S at 481 (rejecting argument in Brief for Federal Appellant at 36,
Bossier I (Nos. 98-405 and 98-406), that the constitutional standard at the time Beer was

decided was the effect standard set forth in White v. Regester).
168.
Id. at 481-82 (citing City of Mobile, 446 U.S. 55, and Arlington Heights, 429 U.S.
252).
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dence of discriminatory intent
69 by 1980, when the Supreme Court decided City of Mobile v. Bolden.'
3. Misinterpreting City of Richmond
Justice Scalia conceded that the Supreme Court in City of Richmond
"did give the purpose prong of § 5 a broader meaning than the effect
prong, ,1 7 but dismissed the significance of this fact on the grounds that
annexations are different from other voting changes.' 7 ' He argued that
effect was defined in such a way in the annexation context that the reduction of Black voting strength in the city from 52 percent to 42
percent was not to be interpreted as violating Section 5: "[t]o hold otherwise would be either to forbid all such annexations" or to permanently
over-represent African Americans in the enlarged city.' 72 "We refused, however, to impose a similar limitation on § 5's purpose prong," he added.
"Preclearance could be denied when the jurisdiction was acting with the
purpose of effecting a percentage reduction in the Black population, even
though it could
not be denied when the jurisdiction's action merely had
1 73
that effect.
Here Justice Scalia characterized the purpose at issue in City of
Richmond as retrogressive intent.1 74 In factual terms, Richmond's purpose
could be described-accurately-as seeking to reduce the Black voting
age population in the city under the existing at-large system, but the
Court did not characterize the purpose issue under Section 5 as retrogressive intent when deciding the case in 1975. 171 It was another dozen years
before the concept of retrogressive intent was first articulated by the Supreme Court-in a dissenting opinion that was soundly rejected by a six

169.
446 U.S. 55 (1980).
170.
Bossier II, 528 U.S. at 330.
171.
Id.
172.
Id. (quoting City of Richmond, 422 U.S. at 371). Nowhere does Justice Scalia
mention that preclearance of this reduction in Black voting strength was contingent on
adoption of an election plan in the enlarged city that fairly reflected Black voting strength
within the new city borders. City of Richmond, 422 U.S. at 371-72.We view this contingency as a critical aspect of the Court's reasoning in annexation cases.
173.
Id. (citing City of Richmond, 422 U.S. at 378-79).
174.
Id. at 331 ("The approved effect of the redistricting in Richmond, and the hypothetically disapproved purpose, were both retrogressive. We found it necessary to make an
exception to normal retrogressive-effect principles, but not to normal retrogressive-purpose
principles, in order to permit routine annexation.") (emphasis added).
175.
Even the concept of retrogressive effect did not exist until a year later when Beer
was decided. Recall Justice Scalia's observation in another context that one cannot assume
that the Supreme Court in City of Richmond was "anticipating (Without argument) that
later holding" in Beer. See Bossier II, 528 U.S. at 337.
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to three76 vote, including that of Justice Scalia himself-in City of Pleasant
Grove.
Instead, the majority in City of Richmond quite explicitly characterized the Section 5 purpose standard as a constitutional purpose standard,
and the Court emphasized that this standard extended beyond annexations
to include other voting changes:
An official action, whether an annexation or otherwise, taken for
the purpose of discriminating against Negroes on account of
their race has no 177legitimacy at all under our Constitution or
under the statute.
In light of the Court's explicit statement that its holding was not
limited to annexations, we cannot agree with Justice Scalia's dismissal of
the Richmond Court's characterization of the Section 5 purpose standard
as reflecting "nothing more than an ex necessitate
limitation upon the effect
'' 7
8
annexation.
of
context
particular
the
in
prong
4. Misconstruing Vote Denial
Even more problematic is the handling of vote denial in Bossier I.
After dismissing the Court's long-standing view that the "unless" clause in
Beer referred to discriminatory purpose, Justice Scalia offered a novel explanation of its meaning:
A much more plausible explanation of the statement is that it
referred to a constitutional violation other than vote dilutionand, more specifically, a violation consisting17of
9 a "denial" of the
right to vote rather than an "abridgement.''
It is difficult to see how a clause that specifically deals with "an ameliorative new legislative apportionment" 8 0 could possibly be viewed as
referring to vote denial, which was not even an issue in the litigation,
rather than vote dilution, which was the case's central focus.
176.
479 U.S. 462 (1987). In his dissenting opinion in Pleasant Grove, Justice Powell
contended that for a jurisdiction to have a discriminatory purpose under Section 5 "it
must intend its action to have a retrogressive effect on the voting rights of Blacks." Id. at
474. This view had the support of only two other justices, however; the majority, including
Justice Scalia, denied preclearance under the purpose prong of Section 5. Id. at 463.
177.
422 U.S. 358, 378-79 (1975) (emphasis added). The Court cited Gomillion v.
ightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960), as sufficient justification for the authority of Congress
to impose such a purpose prong under Section 5.
178.
Bossier II, 528 U.S. at 330-31.
179.
Id. at 337-38.
180.
425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) ("We conclude, therefore, that such an ameliorative
new legislative apportionment cannot violate § 5 unless the new apportionment itself so
discriminates on the basis of race or color as to violate the Constitution.").
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The retrogressive effect standard has consistently been understood,
since its creation in Beer, to apply to vote denial as well as abridgement.'"'
For this reason it would be logical to assume that-if the purpose prong
of Section 5 is restricted to retrogressive intent when assessing changes
with a dilutive potential, as the Court said in Bossier I-then it would
have the same definition when assessing changes with a potential for vote
denial.1 2 Justice Scalia conceded that "in the context of denial claims, no
less than in the context of abridgement claims, the antibacksliding rationale for § 5 (and its effect of avoiding preservation of an even worse status
quo) suggests that retrogression should again be the criterion."' 8 3 He asserted nevertheless that "arguably in that context the word 'deny' (unlike
the word 'abridge') does not import a comparison with the status quo"' 84
as in the concept of retrogression under Section 5. As a result, he observes,
implausibly we think: "our holding today does not extend to violations
consisting of an outright 'denial' of an individual's right to vote, as opposed to an 'abridgement' as in dilution cases." '85This implies, although
the Court did not expressly hold, that purpose means one thing under
Section 5 when reviewing ballot access changes and quite another when
reviewing changes in election methods or redistricting plans.'86
5. Minimizing the Purpose Requirement
The boldest stroke in Justice Scalia's interpretation of the disputed
wording in Beer is his dismissal of its significance, despite its quarter century of application,
on the ground that it is dictum, and thus not binding
87
precedent.
In any event, it is entirely clear that the statement in Beer was
pure dictum. The Government had made no contention that
the proposed reapportionment at issue was unconstitutional.
181.
See, e.g., Motomura, supra note 14, at 204-05.
182.
Bossier I1,
528 U.S. at 338.
183.
Id.
184.
Id.
185.
Id. at 338 n.6.
186.
Of course, such a reading would be at odds with Justice Scalia's goal of promoting textual clarity by assigning the same meaning to the words "purpose" and "effect" in
Section 5.
187.
In fact, Justice Scalia has often explained away language from prior decisions
that he disagrees with by labeling it as dictum. See, e.g., Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S.
101, 113-14 (2002) (The statement [in Scott v. United States, 437 U.S. 82 (1978)] upon
which the dissent relies ...was nothing more than dictum."); Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S.
162, 170 n.3 (2002) ("To the extent the 'mandates a reversal' statement [in Wood v. Georgia,
450 U.S. 261 (1981)] goes beyond the assertion of mere jurisdiction to reverse, it is dictum."); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 n.5 (2001) (describing a footnote in
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1996), as "second-hand dictum").

MichiganJournal of Race & Law

[VOL. 11:275

And though we have quoted the dictum in subsequent cases,
we have never actually applied it to deny preclearance. 8
Appellants in Bossier II had argued that defining the Section 5 purpose standard as retrogressive intent would restrict its application to rare
instances in which covered jurisdictions adopted a change with the intention of making minority voters worse off than
89 under the status quo, but
were unsuccessful in accomplishing that goal.1
Nothing in the text, legislative history, or decisions of this
Court construing Section 5 suggests that the purpose prong
has such a trivial reach, limited to the case of the incompetent
retrogressor.,90
Justice Scalia admitted that such instances of "malevolent incompetence" would be rare, but "it [the "incompetent retrogressor" exception] is
enough
to justify the separate existence of the purpose prong in the statute.''19 1
Justice Scalia readily admitted that, as appellants had contended, "our
reading of § 5 would require the District Court or Attorney General to
preclear proposed voting changes with a discriminatory effect or purpose,
or even with both."'9 2
That strikes appellants as an inconceivable prospect only because they refuse to accept the limited meaning that we have
said preclearance has in the vote-dilution context. It does not
represent approval of the voting change; it is nothing more
than a determination that the voting change is no more dilutive than what it replaces, and therefore ...
must be attacked
93
through the normal means of a § 2 action.1

188.
Bossier II, 528 U.S. at 338 (citations omitted). We find this claim difficult to
square with the application of the purpose standard after Beer by the Court itself (supra
text accompanying note 40), and by the lower courts. For example, in Busbee v. Smith, 549
E Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd mem., 459 U.S. 1166 (1983), the Supreme Court summarily affirmed a lower court judgment that relied entirely on the Beer "dictum" to find a
discriminatory (though nonretrogressive) purpose in the adoption of a Georgia congressional redistricting plan.
189.
Reply Brief for the Federal Appellant at 9, Bossier I (Nos. 98-405 and 98-406).
190.
Id.
191.
Bossier II, 528 U.S. at 331-32. Justice Scalia also asserted that there would be
additional instances in which the retrogressive intent standard would present a harder
threshold for jurisdictions to meet than the retrogressive effect standard-a view we find
improbable. Id.
192.
Id. at 335.
193.
Id. "As we have repeatedly noted," writes Justice Scalia, "in vote-dilution cases
5 prevents nothing but backsliding, and preclearance under 5 5 affirms nothing but the
absence of backsliding." Id.
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To give the purpose prong the expansive reading advocated by the
United States, warned Justice Scalia, would "exacerbate the 'substantial'
federalism costs that the preclearance procedure already exacts,"' 9 and
could well raise "concerns about 5 5's constitutionality."""
We have always understood the "federalism costs" of Section 5 to be
the requirement that all voting changes must secure federal approval before being enforced, together with the fact that in a preclearance review
the burden of proof shifts to the submitting jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court determined in 1966 that these federalism costs were justified by the
substantial record of racial discrimination placed before the Congress
when it adopted the Voting Rights Act. 196 We doubt that defining the
statutory meaning of purpose as identical to its meaning under the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments would increase the federalism costs of
Section 5 beyond the level approved by the Supreme Court four decades
ago, or lead a fair-minded Court to find Section 5 unconstitutional.197
IV

IN THE WAKE OF BOSSIER II

A. The Patternof Objections
The impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Bossier II was dramatic, as measured by the number of objections interposed by the
Department in its wake. Since the Court's decision on January 24, 2000,
the Department interposed only 41 objections, as compared with 250
objections during a comparable period a decade earlier. 1 98 Moreover, virtually all of these objections were based on a finding of retrogressive
194.
Id. at 336 (quoting Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999)).
195.
Id. (citing Miller, 515 U.S. at 926-27).
196.
South Carolinav. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301.
197.
Of course, the record developed by the Congress when considering reauthorization or revision of Section 5 will necessarily be a much different record that in 1965.
Whether the record of more recent voting changes continues to justify the preclearance
requirement will be an issue in likely court challenges after 2007. See, e.g., Michael J. Pitts,
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: A Once and Future Remedy?, 81 DENVER U. L. REV. 225
(2003).
198.
The comparable period would be from Jan. 26, 1990, to June 25, 1994. We are
not arguing that there would likely have been approximately 250 objections after January,
2000, had Bossier II not eliminated the long-standing Section 5 purpose standard. Doubtless the number of potentially objectionable changes would have been somewhat lower
than in the 1990s due to changed political circumstances. Where the Democratic Party
controlled the legislature, the increased role of minority officeholders in the decisionmaking process in covered jurisdictions, due to earlier successes in enforcing the Voting
Rights Act, might have occasioned fewer objectionable changes. On the other hand, Black
elected officials would likely have had little influence in Republican-controlled legislatures. That said, the gap between 40 and 250 is substantial, and likely cannot be explained
by these other changes alone.
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effect; only two of the 41 objections were based entirely on the elusive
concept of retrogressive intent.
TABLE 4:
LEGAL BASES FOR OBJECTIONS SINCE BOSSIER
Change Type
Annexations
At-large
Enhancing
Devices
Districting
Other
Totals

II

Retrogressive

Retrogressive

%

Both

%

Totals

Intent
1
0
0

Effect
1
2
6

4%
7%
21%

1
1
0

8%
8%

3
3
6

15
4
28

54%
14%
100%

10
1
13

77%
8%
101%

26
5
43

1
0
2

50%

50%
100%

Note:Totals do not always equal 100 percent, due to rounding.

One of the two objections based on retrogressive intent involved an
annexation in the town of North, South Carolina, that would have added
only two White people to the town's voting age population. There was
evidence, however, that "a large number of Black persons" living just outside the town's borders had unsuccessfully sought annexation.'99 Granting
the requested annexation would have swung the town from a White to a
Black population majority. Town officials had routinely assisted Whites in
complying with annexation requirements but made no effort to disseminate information about annexation procedures to nearby Black applicants.
"The test for determining whether or not a jurisdiction made racially
selective annexations," wrote the Department, "is whether the annexation
policies and standards applied to white areas are different than those applied to minority areas. ' °
The other objection based only on retrogressive intent involved a
redistricting plan for Cumberland County,Virginia. There was a small reduction in the Black percentage of the voting age population in the
county's one Black-majority district, but the change was only from 55.7
to 55.2 percent, leaving the district still arguably viable for minoritypreferred candidates. However, the county apparently went to great
lengths to reduce the Black proportion in the district because, as the Department put it, "given the demographics in the area, it was virtually
impossible to devise an illustrative plan which did not increase the dis-

199.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Objection Letter to City of North, Orangeburg County,
South Carolina (Sept. 16, 2003).
200.
Id. The Department relied on both Bossier II, 528 U.S. at 339-41, and City of
Pleasant Grove, 479 U.S. 462, in interposing the objection, and noted that town officials
had frequently failed to supply requested information.
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trict's Black population percentage."20' The areas moved out of the old
district were, moreover, those Black neighborhoods "from which the
Black-preferred candidate in District 3 drew substantial support in the
1995 and 1999 elections," leading the Department to conclude that the
plan reflected a retrogressive intent.2 2
One objection was based on the concept of future retrogression. The
city of Charleston, South Carolina, reduced the number of Blackmajority districts from six to five (out of 12 in the benchmark plan), but
the Department recognized that as a result of demographic changes in the
city this was necessary to meet one-person, one-vote requirements, and
was thus preclearable. One of the city's Black-majority districts, however,
had been combined with a new, up-scale residential development on
Daniel Island, part of a neighboring county annexed to the city some
years earlier. The city conceded that the development "will have mostly
white residents in the future," so that in a few years the district would no
longer afford African American voters an opportunity to elect candidates
of their choice. 3
Most objections involved straightforward cases of retrogression. In
roughly a third of the 41 objections in Table 4 the Department also concluded, following an Arlington Heights analysis, that the submitting
jurisdiction intended to make matters worse for minority voters. Of
course, in those instances the change would not have been legally enforceable even without the purpose finding.
B. Erosion of the Retrogression Standard:Georgia v. Ashcroft
On June 26, 2003, the Supreme Court announced yet another significant change in the standard for preclearing voting changes in the
redistricting case Georgia v. Ashcroft. 2 4 Before this decision, written by Justice O'Connor for a five-person majority, analysis of redistricting plans
under the retrogressive effect standard focused on a change's impact on

201.

U.S. Dep't of Justice, Objection Letter to Cumberland County Virginia (July 9,

2002).

202.
Id.
203.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Objection Letter to City of Charleston, Charleston
County, South Carolina (Oct. 12, 2001). Once again, the Department relied on Bossier II
and Pleasant Grove in its decision. Id.
204.
539 U.S. 461 (2003). Professor Pamela Karlan writes that the decision presents "a
profound transformation in what 'effective exercise of the electoral franchise' means."
Pamela S. Karlan, Georgia v. Ashcroft and the Retrogression of Retrogression, 3 ELECTION L.J.
21, 30 (2004). We largely agree with Professor Karlan's incisive analysis of the decision's
ambiguities, but we are less confident about predicting its transformative impact.
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the opportunity of minority voters to elect their preferred candidates. °5
In Georgia, however, the Court parted company with that precedent, emphasizing that "the power to influence the political process is not limited
to winning elections, ' 20 6 and that "a court should not focus solely on the
comparative ability of a minority group to elect a candidate of its
choice.'-2° In this new scheme of things, states are now permitted to
choose varying combinations of. 1) the traditional "safe" majorityminority districts; 2) what Justice O'Connor called "coalitional" districts;
or 3) somewhat nebulously defined "influence" districts. 208
As in the past, the first option, maintaining the same proportion of
safe majority-minority districts in which "it is highly likely that minority
voters will be able to elect the candidate of their choice" would entitle a
jurisdiction to preclearance. 20 9 Under the second option, a state could
now "choose to create a greater number of districts in which it is likelyalthough perhaps not as likely as under the benchmark plan-that minority voters will be able to elect candidates of their choice. ' 210 In such
coalitional districts, minority voters combine to form a functional majority with "white voters who are willing to form interracial political
2t1
coalitions in support of minority candidates., 212
One recent court designated this sort of district a "crossover" district.

205.
This focus stemmed from the command in Allen, 393 U.S. at 569, to protect
minority voters from changes with the potential to "nullify their ability to elect the candidate of their choice."
206.
Georgia v. Ashcrofi, 539 U.S. at 482 (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 99
(1986) (O'ConnorJ, concurring)).
207.
Id. at 480.
208.
Id. at 480-82.
209.
Id. at 480.
210.
Id. Here Justice O'Connor cited a law review article by Richard H. Pildes, who
referred to this sort of district as "coalitional." Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now
At War With Itselj? Social Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. Rv. 1517, 1522
(2002) (distinguishing between "safe" districts, in which "a majority of the voting-age
population is made up of minority voters," and coalitional districts in which minority
voters combine to form a functional majority with "white voters who are willing to form
interracial political coalitions in support of minority candidates").
211.
See Pildes, supra note 210, at 1522. For more than a decade some voting rights
experts have treated such coalitional districts as a viable alternative to majority-minority
districts where the empirical evidence demonstrates a realistic opportunity for the election
of candidates preferred by minority voters. See, e.g., Allan J. Lichtman & J. Gerald Hebert,
A General Theory of Vote Dilution, 6 LA RAzA L.J. 1, 4, 10-18 (1993) ("The test is not
achievement of an arbitrary level of minority population, but the realistic potential of
minority voters to elect candidates of their choice."); see also id. at 14 (referring to "functional-majority" districts where "coalition voting provides minorities a realistic potential
to elect candidates of their choice, despite the lack of a numerical population majority");J.
Morgan Kousser, Beyond Gingles: Influence Districts and the PragmaticTradition in Voting Rights
Law, 27 U.S.F.L. REv. 551,563-69 (1993).
212.
Meza v. Galvin, 322 F. Supp. 2d 52, 63 (D. Mass. 2004) (defining a crossover
district as one "in which minority groups constitute under 50% of the relevant population
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Coalitional or crossover districts, like the traditional majorityminority districts, permit minority voters to elect candidates of their
choice. By spreading minority voters across a larger number of districts,
coalition districts offer the possibility of greater substantive representation-the election of a larger number of representatives who are
responsive to the views of minority voters-but by increasing the need
for crossover votes that approach also, Justice O'Connor recognized, carries an increased "risk that the minority group's preferred candidate might
lose. 2 13 Despite that risk, all nine justices agreed that coalition districts
provided an acceptable alternative to safe districts, where justified by the
observed level of crossover voting.2 14
The third choice, the use of "influence" districts, presents minority
voters only with the opportunity to play some indeterminate role in the
election. Justice O'Connor's characterization of influence districts was
extremely vague: "minority voters may not be able to elect a candidate of
choice but can play a substantial, if not decisive, role in the electoral process. 2 1 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals put it somewhat more
clearly: influence districts are those "in which a minority group has
enough political heft to exert significant influence on the choice of the
candidate though not enough to determine that choice., 216 It is not clear,
on the other hand, how coalition and influence districts should be
"weighted"in comparison either to each other or to safe districtswhen measuring retrogression. "Being part of a winning coalition in
which a sufficient number of white voters support a candidate sponsored
by the Black community may be quite different from having some less
direct effect on election outcomes.,
Unlike a coalitional district, neither courts nor political scientists
have developed clear measures of what constitutes an influence district.218
Professor Pamela Karlan quite properly emphasizes that "the concentration of Black voters necessary to create safe, coalitional, or influence
2 17

in the proposed district but with the help of non-minority crossover votes have the ability
to elect preferred officials").
213.
Georgia, 539 U.S. at 481.
214.
Id. at 480-81,492.
215.
Id. at 482; see also Rodriguez v. Pataki, 308 F Supp. 2d 346, 375-76 (S.D.N.Y)
(distinguishing between "coalition or "crossover" districts and influence districts), aff'd
mem., 73 U.S.L.W 3315 (2004); Hall v. Virginia, 276 E Supp. 2d 528, 533-34 (E.D.Va.
2003) (same), aff'd, 385 E3d 421 (4th Cir. 2004).
216.
Barnett v. City of Chicago, 141 E3d 699, 703 (7th Cit. 1998) (reserving the
question of influence districts).
217.
Karlan, supra note 204, at 32 ("The Court seemed to treat coalitional and influence districts as fingible, but they are decidedly not the same.") (internal citation

omitted).
218.
Pildes, supra note 210, at 1539 ("The concept of influence is nebulous and difficult to quantify.")
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districts will depend on the degree of racial bloc voting. ' Only where
White crossover voting is sufficient to provide minority voters opportunity to elect candidates of choice, for example, are coalitional districts
feasible. For this reason, "the validity of the Court's entire analysis depends
on the relative absence of racial bloc voting within a covered jurisdic,,220
tion.
In the past, the Supreme Court had left open the question of
whether the right of minority voters to coalition or crossover districtsbut not mere influence districts-is protected as a vote-dilution claim under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 221 While leaving the question
open, however, the Court noted in Voinovich v. Quilted22 that in order to
provide a right to such districts, "the first Gingles precondition, the requirement that the group be sufficiently large to constitute )223
a, majority in a
single district, would have to be modified or eliminated.
The lower
courts
have
uniformly
rejected
both
coalition
and
influence
district
• 224
claims. Thus, the majority in Georgia v. Ashcroft created an option for
covered jurisdictions seeking preclearance of redistricting plans which the
federal courts, in practice, routinely deny minority plaintiffs in Section 2
litigation.
As Justice O'Connor put it, borrowing the language of political scientists, the Court in Georgia v. Ashcroft sought to expand the choice of
jurisdictions seeking preclearance of redistricting plans to include not

219.
Karlan, supra note 204, at 34.
220.
Id. Notably, Justice O'Connor's opinion never discussed the levels of polarized
voting in particular Georgia senate districts; thus, "it was impossible to tell whether any of
those districts was in fact a coalitional or influence district." Id. at 35.
221.
Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 150 (1993) (using the term "influence districts" for "districts in which Black voters would not constitute a majority but in which
they could, with the help of a predictable number of cross-over votes from white voters,
elect their candidates of choice"-in other words, "coalition" or "crossover" districts). Also
leaving open this possibility were Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46-47 nn.11-12 (1986), Growe v.
Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 41 n.5 (1993), andJohnson v. De Grandy,512 U.S. 997, 1009 (1994).
222.
507 U.S. 146.
223.
Id. at 158.
224.
Numerous appellate courts have rejected influence district claims. See, e.g.,
Cousins v. Sundquist, 145 E3d 818, 828 (6th Cir. 1998) ("[W]e would reverse any decision
to allow such a claim to proceed since we do not feel that an 'influence' claim is permitted
under the Voting Rights Act."); McNeil v. Springfield Park Dist., 851 E2d 937, 947 (7th
Cir. 1988) ("[W]e cannot consider claims that ...districts merely impair plaintiffs' ability
to influence elections."). Both coalition and influence districts have also consistently been
rejected as options for satisfying the first prong of the Gingles test. See, e.g.,Valdespino v.
Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 E3d 848, 851-53 (5th Cir. 1999); Negron v. City of
Miami Beach, 113 E3d 1563, 1569 (11th Cir. 1997); Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 E2d
1418, 1424 n.7 (9th Cir. 1989); Rodriguez, 308 E Supp. at 375-76. 378, 383; Hall, 276 E
Supp. 2d at 534-36. But see Metts v. Murphy, 363 F3d 8, 11-12 (1st Cir. 2004) (en banc)
(vacating a lower court decision that dismissed a coalitional district claim in'a Section 2
lawsuit and remanding for further proceedings).
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only the traditional "descriptive representation"-an equal opportunity to
elect the preferred candidates of minority voters-but also "substantive
representation"-an equal opportunity to elect "representatives sympathetic to the interests of minority voters. '22 s This distinction stems not
from legal precedents but from a substantial social science literature cited
by Justice O'Connor.226
The studies cited by the Court focus on the question of substantive
representation of minority interests in Congress, using roll call votes on
numerous bills, arrayed along what amounts to a liberalism-conservatism
scale, and treating the position of minority voters on issues measured in
national opinion polls as a proxy for the substantive interests of minority
voters. The principal findings of these studies are that the substantive representation in Congress of both African American and (non-Cuban)
Hispanic voters is best advanced by the election of Democrats-whether
White or Black, Anglo or Latino-and that something like a 40 percent
minority voting-age population is a necessary threshold for electing such
candidates.227
Without specifically mentioning the analysis of roll call votesJustice
O'Connor emphasized that "the very purpose of voting is to delegate to
chosen representatives the power to make and pass laws," and that preclearance reviews should "examine the comparative position of legislative
leadership, influence, and power for representatives of the benchmark majority-minority districts. 22 8 Under this approach, such an investigation

225.

Georgia v.Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 483. As the decision notes:
Indeed, the State's choice ultimately may rest on a political choice of
whether substantive or descriptive representation is preferable .... The State
may choose, consistent with § 5, that it is better to risk having fewer minority representatives in order to achieve greater overall representation of a
minority group by increasing the number of representatives sympathetic to
the interests of minority voters.

Id.
226.

Id. at 482-83.

227.
Among the studies cited by Justice O'Connor, those providing the most probative evidence are Charles Cameron et al., Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize

Substantive Black Representation in Congress, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 794 (1996), and David
Lublin, Racial Redistricting and African American Representation:A Critique of "Do MajorityMinority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress", 93 Am. POL. Sci.
REV. 183 (1999). But see CAROL M.

SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK

INTERESTS:THE REPRESEN-

211-16 (1993). The most thorough
and careful investigation of the substantive representation issue is DAvID LUBLIN, THE PARATATION or AFRICAN AMERICANS IN CONGRESS 56-58,
DOX

OF

REPRESENTATION:

RACIAL

GERRYMANDERING

AND

MINORITY

INTERESTS

IN

CONGRESS (1997). If this sort of evidence is what the Georgia v. Ashcroft decision anticipated, then preclearance reviews of redistricting plans will for the first time need to
examine legislative roll call votes in order to determine which legislators were generally
responsive to the interests of minority voters.
228.
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 483.
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would in most cases begin with the issue of which party controlled the
legislative body, because from that determination flows the choice of
committee chairmanships, control over the legislative agenda, and ability
to secure passage of legislation.2 29 "Maintaining or increasing legislative
positions of power for minority voters' representatives of choice, while
not dispositive by itself, can show the lack of retrogressive effect under
§ 5*.,2'0 Thus, the courts and the Department will now have to examine a
host of governance issues arising within the legislative process and having
little directly to do with the electoral process. 2311
Whether the representatives elected from majority-minority districts
in the benchmark plan supported or opposed the new plan was to Justice
O'Connor "significant, though not dispositive," not just in regard to the
232
purpose of the plan but also in regard to assessing retrogressive effect.
The majority opinion treated these officeholders as knowledgeable observers of the political process whose view of "whether the proposed
change will decrease minority voters' effective exercise of the electoral
franchise" is entitled to deference.233 Under this new standard, in short,

229.
Id. at 483-84 ("A lawmaker with more legislative influence has more potential
to set the agenda, to participate in closed-door meetings, to negotiate from a stronger
position, and to shake hands on a deal.") In Georgia, as in most states, the party which
provided the most leadership opportunities for representatives elected by minority voters,
was the Democratic Party. Karlan, supra note 204, at 26, 33. Thus under this new view of
retrogression, evidence that a plan maintained or enhanced the chances that Democrats
would control the state senate would presumably enhance the likehhood of preclearance.
230.
Georgia v.Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 484.
231.
This aspect of the Court's analysis, as Professor Karlan points out, "stands in
some tension with its decision in Presley v. Etowah County Commission[, 502 U.S. 491
(1992)]." Karlan, supra note 204, at 34. In that case, the Court held that "[c]hanges which
affect only the distribution of power among officials are not subject to section 5 because
such changes have no direct relation to, or impact on, voting." 502 U.S. at 506. After Etowah County had agreed to shift from at-large to district elections, the county commission
stripped the commissioner elected from the new Black-majority district of traditional
powers of his office. Presley v. Etowah County Conm'n, 869 F Supp. 1555, 1573 (M.D.
Ala. 1994). As a technical matter, Presley dealt only with defining the scope of voting
changes covered by Section 5-not with defining the evidence that is relevant in assessing
retrogression, as in Georgia v. Ashcroft. Yet if changes that decrease the power of minority
legislators within a governing body need not even be submitted for preclearance, we agree
with Professor Karlan that it "seems perverse to treat maintaining or increasing such power
as evidence of nonretrogression." Karlan, supra note 204, at 34.
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 484.
232.
See id. Of course, sometimes those minority legislators are overconfident. As
233.
Karlan writes:
The senate majority leader, Charles Walker, who had expressed confidence
that the reduction in Black population and voting strength in his district
would not affect minority voting strength-his district went from being
roughly 63 percent in voting age population with a Black voter-registration
majority to being just shghtly over 50 percent in voting age population and
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minority legislators play a key role. Whether the party to which they belong is able to control a legislative majority, whether their party is
generally responsive to the positions they take on particular roll calls, and
whether or not they favor the proposed plan have become issues on
which a preclearance decision can turn. 234
In short, the majority decision in Georgia v. Ashcroft makes the standard by which retrogression is to be determined much more ambiguous
than before, especially in its license to utilize influence districts. By giving
covered jurisdictions two different approaches from which to choose, Justice O'Connor's new standard may arguably have made it easier to secure
preclearance for redistricting plans. Yet this should not be viewed as a
foregone conclusion. When the trial court began to consider the case on
remand, it proved necessary to reopen discovery on a host of evidentiary
235
issues.
We cannot agree with the assertion of one recent commentator that
Georgia v. Ashcroft was "the most important voting-rights decision in a
generation., 236 The full implications of the opinion will likely become
clear only when the Department and the trial courts wrestle with the
new issues it poses and determine what sorts of evidence are necessary to
meet the new standard.23 7 This is not likely to happen in the near future,
minority Black in voter registration-was defeated by a white Republican in
a racially polarized election.
Karlan, supra note 204, at 29.
234.
Professor Karlan points out that "the Court's analysis essentially equates the
interests of minority voters with the interests of incumbent minority politicians, completely ignoring the presence of any conflict in interest between them," such as the
propensity of incumbent legislators to "redraw district lines to render themselves less vulnerable to robust political competition, thereby elevating their own interest in reelection
over voters' interests." Karlan, supra note 204, at 33.
235.
See, e.g., Georgia v. Ashcroft, C.A. No. 1:01 CV 02111 (D.D.C.Jan. 7, 2004) (discovery order) (setting forth requirements for designation of experts, production of data
required by experts, and deadlines for expert reports).Trial was initially scheduled for May,
2004, but the case became moot when a three-judge court in Georgia found that a similar
plan (the plan corrected to secure preclearance and used in the 2002 elections) violated
the one-person, one-vote principle. Larios v. Cox, 300 E Supp. 2d 1320, 1338 (N.D. Ga.
2004), aftd, 542 U.S. 947 (2004).
236.
Richard H. Pildes, Less Power, More Influence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2003, at A23
(cited in The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Leading Cases, 117 HARv.L. REv. 469, 470 (2003)).
We quite agree, however, with Ellen D. Katz, Reinforcing Representation: CongressionalPower
to Enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in the Rehnquist and Waite Courts, 101
MICH. L. REv. 2341, 2381 (2003)(commenting that in the Georgia case "[t]he Court accordingly relies on a far more malleable conception of retrogression than it espoused in
the Bossier Parish cases").
237.
In a very shrewd Note, Meghann E. Donahue estimates how, under the Department's guidelines for administering Section 5, the Court's command to examine the
"totality of the circumstances" is likely to be implemented. Meghann E. Donahue, Note,
The Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated:AdministeringSection 5 of the Voting Rights
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because the Court's decision came near the end of the redistricting cycle,
so that few local and no statewide redistricting plans are left unprecleared.
Furthermore the decision likely affects only the review of redistricting
plans-not all voting changes. As our analysis has shown, the Bossier II
decision had a far more profound and demonstrable impact on the enforcement of Section 5.
CONCLUSION
Because Bossier II was the most transformative decision regarding
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act since the 1976 opinion in Beer v.
United States, the story we have told in the preceding pages focuses on
that decision, the changes it wrought in Section 5 case law, and its impact
on enforcement of the preclearance requirement by the Department of
Justice. We began by describing the evolution of the standards for preclearance review set forth in each of the significant Section 5 declaratory
judgment cases.We also illustrated in some detail the legal basis on which
the Department of Justice objected to voting changes of all types, and
provided a systematic quantitative analysis of how the legal bases for objections evolved over time.
Our principal finding was that by the 1990s, the purpose prong of
Section 5 hadSecion5
become
the dominant
ob
" .238Almost
bcomhd th
dminnt legal
ega basis
bais for
orobjections.
half (45 percent) of all objections were based on purpose alone. If we include objections based both on purpose and retrogressive effect, and those
based both on purpose and Section 2, the Department's finding of discriminatory - purpose was present in 78 percent of all decisions to
interpose objections in the decade preceding Bossier II. Looking only at
redistricting plans, the pattern is even more stark. Purpose alone accounted for 58 percent of all objections in the 1990s, another 17 percent
were based both on purpose and retrogressive effect, and another 14 percent were based on both purpose and Section 2. That means that a
purpose finding was present in an astonishing 89 percent of all redistricting objections in that decade.239
In short, the jurisprudential change likely to have the greatest impact on the incidence of objections by the late 1990s was to eliminate the
purpose prong of Section 5. That is, in effect, what the majority opinion
in Bossier H accomplished. By overturning the long-standing view that the
purpose standard under Section 5 was identical to the purpose test in a
Act after Georgia v. Ashcroft, 104 COLUM. L. Rav. 1651, 1671-85 (2004). We find her assessment plausible.
238.
See infra Table 2.
239.
Retrogressive effect was by far the most numerous basis for objections in the
1970s (72 percent) and still numerous in the 19 80s (45 percent), but had shrunk to only
20 percent of all objections by the 1990s. Objections based only on the "clear violation of
Section 2" rule were trivial in number throughout.
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Fourteenth Amendment challenge, in favor of the long-dismissed view
that under Section 5 the purpose test was limited to whether the jurisdiction had a retrogressive intent, the majority in Bossier II guaranteed that
the number of objections would be very substantially reduced.
When Congress turns its attention to deciding the future of Section
5, which is set to expire in 2007 if not extended, there will doubtless be
calls for amendments to narrow (or increase) its scope, to narrow (or increase) its geographical coverage, and the like.Whatever changes Congress
makes should, of course, be designed in light of the evidence as to the
current threats facing minority voters. For the cause of minority voting
rights, we believe there can be no more important change than to restore
the traditional purpose requirement that guided enforcement of the preclearance requirement for the quarter century preceding Bossier I. The
Court's decision in that case turned in many respects on what Justice
Scalia saw as the garbled syntax of Section 5--syntax that had left the Supreme Court untroubled for 35 years. It does not seem too much to ask
Congress to revise the provision's language so as to make clear that the
purpose standard under Section 5 is identical to the way in which discriminatory purpose is assessed in Fourteenth Amendment cases.

